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CONSISTENCY  IS  KEY:  TO  PRESERVE  LEGISLATIVE  
INTENT  THE  IRS  MUST  AFFORD  LEGAL  
RECOGNITION  TO  NON-­‐‑MARITAL  RELATIONSHIPS  
IN  A  POST-­‐‑DOMA  WORLD  
Shane  R.  Martins*  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The  United  States  is  currently  engulfed  in  a  transformation  that  
may   be   more   powerful   than   one   based   on   culture,   history,   or  
even  tradition:  a  transformation  based  on  acceptance.     Over  the  
past   several   decades,   the   rights   afforded   to   homosexuals   and  
same-­‐‑sex  couples  have  remained  one  of  the  more  hotly  contested  
issues.    While  supporters  of  the  gay  rights  movement  may  not  be  
completely   satisfied   with   the   current   state   of   equality,  
undeniable  progress  has  been  made  with  respect  to  the  rights  of  
gay   Americans.      Although   societal   progress   is   generally  
favorable,   the   resulting   change   can   often   generate   uncertainty  
and  confusion,  as  is  the  case  with  the  current  tax  system  and  its  
treatment  of  same-­‐‑sex  couples.  
Recently,   the   judicial   branch   has   been   home   to   countless  
claims   concerning   the   unequal   treatment   of   same-­‐‑sex   couples.    
More   specifically,   there   were   several   cases   pending   in   federal  
courts  regarding  the  constitutionality  of  the  Defense  of  Marriage  
Act   (DOMA).1      All   of   the   cases   questioning   DOMA’s  
 
*  J.D.,  Benjamin  N.  Cardozo  School  of  Law,  2014.    B.S.  Suffolk  University,  May  2010.    
Notes  Editor,  CARDOZO  JOURNAL  OF  INTERNATIONAL  AND  COMPARATIVE  LAW,  Vol.  
22.      Thank  you   to  Professor  Carlton   Smith   for   your   time   and   infinite   knowledge.    
My  deepest  gratitude  to  Frances  Smith  and  Ariana  Ventresca  for  a  lifetime  of  love,  
laughs,   and   encouragement.      This   Article   is   dedicated   to   my   parents,   John   and  
Carol  Martins,  and  my  brother  Tyler;  you  three  allow  me  to  pursue  my  dreams,  for  
that  I  am  forever  indebted  to  you.    
   1.     Defense   of   Marriage   Act.,   Pub.   L.   No.   104-­‐‑199,   110   Stat.   2419   (1996)  
(codified  at  28  U.S.C.  §  178C  (2012)  and  1  U.S.C.  §  7  (2012)).  
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constitutionality   focused  on  one  argument:  DOMA  violated  the  
Equal   Protection   Clause.2      The   Supreme   Court   of   the   United  
States  seemed  to  agree  with  this  contention,  and  on  June  26,  2013  
it   found   DOMA   to   be   an   unconstitutional   “deprivation   of   the  
liberty  of  the  person  protected  by  the  Fifth  Amendment”.3  
Prior   to   the   Court’s   ruling   in   United   States   v.   Windsor,  
Section  3  of  DOMA  prevented  any  federal  institution  or  agency  
from   recognizing   same-­‐‑sex   marriages.4      Consequently,   the  
Internal  Revenue  Service  (IRS)  was  unable  to  completely  defer  to  
each   state’s   definition   of   marriage.      However,   the   recent  
declaration   of   DOMA’s   unconstitutionality   means   that   the  
federal  statute  will  no  longer  circumscribe  the  Internal  Revenue  
Code’s  (IRC)  recognition  of  marriages.    Due  to  the  precedent  set  
by  extensive  case  law,5  the  IRS  will  now  have  to  recognize  same-­‐‑
sex  marriages   in   states  where   such  unions  are   legal.     Although  
the   overturning   of   DOMA   will   create   a   greater   sense   of  
uniformity  among  the  states  that  recognize  same-­‐‑sex  marriages,  
it   will   still   leave   one   problem   unsolved:   How  will   the   IRS   tax  
other   legally   recognized   unions,   such   as   civil   unions   and  
domestic  partnerships?6  
Without  receiving  the  necessary  congressional  mandate,  the  
 
   2.     The  Equal  Protection  Clause  is  found  in  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  of  the  
United  States  Constitution.    The  Clause  states:  
All   persons   born   or   naturalized   in   the   United   States,   and   subject   to   the  
jurisdiction   thereof,   are   citizens   of   the   United   States   and   of   the   State  
wherein  they  reside.     No  State  shall  make  or  enforce  any  law  which  shall  
abridge   the  privileges  or   immunities  of   citizens  of   the  United  States;  nor  
shall  any  State  deprive  any  person  of  life,  liberty,  or  property,  without  due  
process   of   law;   nor   deny   to   any   person  within   its   jurisdiction   the   equal  
protection  of  the  laws.  
U.S.  CONST.  amend.  XIV,  §  1.  
   3.     United  States  v.  Windsor,  133  S.Ct.  2675,  2695  (2013).  
   4.     Id.  at  2683.  
   5.     See,   e.g.,   Sullivan   v.   Comm’r,   256   F.2d   664,   666   (4th   Cir.   1958);   Lee   v.  
Comm’r,  550  F.2d  1201,  1202  (9th  Cir.  1977).  Moreover,  on  August  29,  2013  the  U.S  
Department  of   the  Treasury   issued  a   statement   that  “all   legal   same-­‐‑sex  marriages  
will  be  recognized  for   federal   tax  purposes.”     See  U.S.  Dep’t  of  Treasury,  All  Legal  
Same-­‐‑Sex   Marriages   Will   Be   Recognized   for   Federal   Tax   Purposes,      U.S.   DEP’T   OF  
TREASURY   (August   29,   2013),   http://www.treasury.gov/press-­‐‑center/press-­‐‑
releases/Pages/jl2153.aspx.    
   6.     For  the  remainder  of  this  Note,  civil  unions  and  domestic  partnerships  will  
be  collectively  referred  to  as  non-­‐‑marital  relationships.      
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IRS  has  already   indicated   that   it  will  not   recognize  civil  unions  
and   domestic   partnerships   as   eligible   for   the   deductions   and  
filing   statuses   available   to   married   couples.7      However,   many  
states   that   offer   non-­‐‑marital   relationships   define,   in   their  
respective   statutes,   that   the   parties   in   these   non-­‐‑marital  
relationships   will   receive   the   same   rights,   benefits,   and  
protections   that   are   afforded   to   legally  married   couples.8     With  
same-­‐‑sex   married   couples   now   recognized   by   the   federal  
government,   this  Article   proposes   that   the   federal   government  
also  give  spousal  recognition  to  taxpayers   in   legally  recognized  
non-­‐‑marital   relationships   in   states   that   treat   such   unions   as  
marriage  equivalents.9    In  doing  so,  the  federal  government  will  
continue   to   adhere   to   its   objectives   of   geographic   uniformity10  
and   horizontal   equity,11   all   while   following   longstanding  
precedent  of  deferring  to  state  familial  law.12  
Part  II  of  this  Article  will  provide  an  introduction  to  Federal  
Income   Tax,   the   concept   of   “filing   jointly,”   and   the   benefits  
provided  to  married  couples  under  the  IRC.    Part  III  will  provide  
an   overview  of   the   history   of   same-­‐‑sex  marriage   in   the  United  
States,   focusing   primarily   on   the  Defense   of  Marriage  Act   and  
how   the   Supreme   Court’s   recent   ruling   in   Windsor   has  
drastically   changed   the   recognition   afforded   to   same-­‐‑sex  
couples.    Part  IV  will  analyze  the  way  in  which  states  recognize  
same-­‐‑sex  relationships.    Part  IV  will  continue  with  an  analysis  of  
the   United   Kingdom’s   treatment   of   non-­‐‑marital   relationships  
and  examine  why  the  foreign  nation’s  law  regarding  such  would  
 
   7.     See  Internal  Revenue  Service,  Questions  and  Answers  for  Registered  Domestic  
Partners,  INTERNAL  REVENUE  SERVICE  (Sep.  19,  2013),  
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Answers-­‐‑to-­‐‑Frequently-­‐‑Asked-­‐‑Questions-­‐‑for-­‐‑Registered-­‐‑
Domestic-­‐‑Partners-­‐‑and-­‐‑Individuals-­‐‑in-­‐‑Civil-­‐‑Unions  (last  visited  Feb.  20,  2013).  
   8.     See,   e.g.,  CAL.   FAM.   CODE   §   297.5   (2007)   (West   2003);   N.J.   STAT.   ANN.   §  
26:8A-­‐‑2(d)  (West  2007);  OR.  REV.  STAT.  §  106.340  (2013).  
   9.     For  purposes  of  this  Article,  the  term  “marriage  equivalent”  indicates  that  
the   non-­‐‑marital   relationship   is   afforded   the   same   rights,   benefits,   and  
responsibilities  that  are  afforded  to  marriages.    Thus,  the  only  difference  being  the  
term  assigned  to  the  union.  
   10.     Druker  v.  Comm’r,  697  F.2d  46,  48  (2d  Cir.  1982).  
   11.     Id.  at  50.  
   12.     See  supra  note  5  and  accompanying  text.  
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be   operative   in   the   United   States.      Part   V   of   this   Article   will  
provide   an   overview  of   the   current   federal   income   tax   laws   as  
prescribed   to   non-­‐‑marital   relationships.      Part   VI   proposes   that  
the  United   States   government   should   offer   spousal   recognition  
to   non-­‐‑marital   relationships,   but   only   in   the   states  where   such  
relationships  are  afforded  the  same  rights  as   legally  recognized  
marriages.      Finally,   Part   VI   will   show   that   this   method   of  
taxation   is   essential   in   order   to   ensure   that   the   government  
remain   consistent  with   both   legal   precedent   and   congressional  
intent.  
II.  THE  FEDERAL  INCOME  TAXATION  OF  MARRIAGES  
A.     HISTORY  OF  JOINT  FILINGS  AND  THE  MARITAL  DEDUCTION  
The   modern   income   tax,   and   its   treatment   of   married  
couples,   began   in   1913.13      Ratified   by   the   states   in   1913,14   the  
Sixteenth  Amendment  grants  Congress   the  “[P]ower   to   lay  and  
collect  taxes  on  incomes,  from  whatever  source  derived,  without  
apportionment  among  the  several  States,  and  without  regard  to  
any   census  or   enumeration.”15     The   ratification  of   the  Sixteenth  
Amendment   eliminated   the   congressional   hurdle   created   by  
Pollock  v.  Famers’  Loan  &  Trust  Co.,16   thereby  making   it  possible  
for  the  government  to  institute  a  national  income  tax.17    Congress  
 
   13.     Christopher   J.  Hayes,  Married  Filing   Jointly:  Federal  Recognition  of  Same-­‐‑Sex  
Marriages  Under  the  Internal  Revenue  Code,  47  HASTINGS  L.J.  1593,  1603  (1996).  
   14.     Tax  Analysts,  The  Income  Tax  Archives,  TAXANALYSTS  (2014),  
http://www.taxhistory.org/www/website.nsf/Web/THM1901?OpenDocument.  
   15.     U.S.  CONST.  amend.  XVI.  
   16.     Pollock  v.  Famers’  Loan  &  Trust  Co.,  15  S.Ct.  673  (1895).    Charles  Pollock,  a  
stockholder  of  Farmers’,   instituted  a  suit  on  behalf  of  the  company’s  stockholders,  
challenging  their  decision  to  provide  the  Department  of  Treasury  with  the  names  of  
all   stockholders   that  would   be   subject   to   the   tax   imposed   by   the  Wilson-­‐‑Groman  
Tariff.      Id.  at  674.     Ruling  in  favor  of  Pollock,   the  Supreme  Court  held,  “under  the  
state  system  of  taxation,  all  taxes  on  real  estate  or  personal  property  or  the  rents  or  
income  thereof  were  regarded  as  direct  taxes.”    Id.  at  686.    The  Court’s  decision  did  
not  rule  on  the  constitutionality  of  the  premise  of   income  tax;  rather,   it  only  ruled  
on   the   method   of   taxation   mandated   by   the   Wilson-­‐‑Gorman   Tariff.      Id.    
Consequently,   the   Court’s   decision   should   merely   be   viewed   as   a   hurdle   to   the  
implementation  of  a  national  income  tax.  
   17.     Daniel  Milstein,  ‘Til  Death  Do  Us  File  Joint  Income  Tax  Returns  (Unless  We’re  
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then   immediately   passed   the   Revenue   Act   of   1913,18   which  
lowered   tariff   rates   and   included  an   income   tax   to   compensate  
for  lost  wages  resulting  from  such  decrease.19  
Four  years  later,  through  the  enactment  of  the  Revenue  Act  
of   1918,20   Congress   permitted  married   couples   to   file   a   “single  
joint   return”   for   federal   income   taxes.21      The   Act   provided,   in  
part,   “If   a  husband  and  wife   living   together  have  an  aggregate  
net   income   of   $2,000   or   over,   each   shall   make   such   a   return  
unless  the  income  of  each  is   included  in  a  single   joint  return.”22    
Although   the  Revenue  Act   of   1918   allowed  married   couples   to  
file  a  single  return,  federal  taxation  continued  to  emphasize  the  
individual   over   the   marital   unit.23      In   fact,   the   applicable   tax  
rates   were   identical   for   married   couples   and   unmarried  
individuals.24   Consequently,   joint   filings   were   only  
advantageous  in  highly  “unusual  circumstances.”25  
In   its   decision   in  Lucas   v.   Earl,   the   Supreme  Court   echoed  
the   sentiment   that   individuals   were   emphasized   over   married  
couples.26    In  Lucas,  the  taxpayer,  Guy  Earl,  and  his  wife  agreed  
that   any   property,   including   earnings,   acquired   during   the  
existence  of  their  marriage  should  be  treated  as  owned  by  them  
equally.27      Pursuant   to   this   agreement,   Mr.   Earl’s   income   tax  
return  reported  only  half  of  his  income  for  the  year  in  question.28    
However,  the  Commissioner  of  Internal  Revenue  and  the  Board  
of   Tax   Appeals   believed   that   Earl   should   have   reported   his  
 
Gay),  9  CARDOZO  PUB.  L.  POL’Y  &  ETHICS  J.  451,  455  (2011).  
   18.     Revenue  Act  of  1913,  Pub.  L.  No.  63-­‐‑16,  38  Stat.  114  (1913).  
   19.     Id.;  see  Tax  Analysts,  supra  note  14.  
   20.     Revenue  Act  of  1918,  Pub.  L.  No.  65-­‐‑254,  40  Stat.  1057  (1918).  
   21.     Revenue  Act  of  1918,  Pub.  L.  No.  65-­‐‑254,  §  223,  40  Stat.  1057,  1074   (1918);  
See  also  Carlton  Smith  &  Edward  Stein,  Dealing  with  DOMA:  Federal  Non-­‐‑Recognition  
Complicates  State  Income  Taxation  of  Same-­‐‑Sex  Relationships,  24.1  COLUM.  J.  GENDER  &  
L.  29,  37  (2012).  
   22.     Revenue  Act  of  1918,  Pub.  L.  No.  65-­‐‑254,  §  223,  40  Stat.  1057,  1074  (1918).  
   23.     Milstein,  supra  note  17,  at  456.  
   24.     Id.  
   25.     See  Boris  I.  Bittker,  Federal  Income  Taxation  and  the  Family,  27  STAN.  L.  REV.  
1389,  1400  (1975).  
   26.     Lucas  v.  Earl,  281  U.S.  111,  114  -­‐‑15  (1930).  
   27.     Id.  at  113-­‐‑14.  
   28.     Id.  
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entire  income.29    On  behalf  of  the  majority,  Justice  Holmes  wrote,  
“[N]o  distinction  can  be  taken  according  to  the  motives  leading  
to   the   arrangement   by   which   the   fruits   are   attributed   to   a  
different  tree  from  that  on  which  they  grew.”30    One  tax  scholar  
has   interpreted  Holmes’s   colorful   analogy   to  mean   “it   became  
virtually   impossible   for   a   taxpayer   with   income   from   wages,  
salaries,   or   professional   fees   to   shift   these   items   to   other  
taxpayers  such  as  a  spouse  or  child.”31  
However,   in   the   same   year,   the   Supreme   Court   issued   a  
ruling  that  married  couples  could,  in  fact,  split  their  incomes  so  
long   as   the   taxpayers   resided   in   a   community   property   state.32    
In   Poe   v.   Seaborn,   H.G.   Seaborn   and   his   wife   each   filed   a   tax  
return   consisting   of   half   of   the   couple’s   income.33      The  
Commissioner   of   Internal   Revenue   for   the   District   of  
Washington,   however,   asserted   that   Seaborn   should   have  
reported  all  of  the  income,  rather  than  splitting  it  with  his  wife.34    
Ruling   in   favor   of   Seaborn,   the   Court   held,   “A   wife   has,   in  
Washington,  a  vested  property  right  in  the  community  property,  
equal   with   that   of   her   husband;   and   in   the   income   of   the  
community,   including   salaries   or   wages   of   either   husband   or  
wife,  or  both.”35  
Subsequent   to   the   Court’s   ruling,   several   non-­‐‑community  
property   states   began   adopting   community  property   systems,36  
thereby   providing   their   residents   with   the   benefits   allowed  
under  Poe.37    There  was  not,  however,  a  nation-­‐‑wide  adoption  of  
the   community   property   system,   as   many   states   refused   to  
 
   29.     Id.  at  113.  
   30.     Id.  at  115.  
   31.     Bittker,  supra  note  25,  at  1401.  
   32.     Poe  v.  Seaborn,  282  U.S.  101   (1930).     Community  property   laws  generally  
state   that   property   acquired   during   a   marriage   is   community   property   and  
therefore   each   spouse   has   a   vested  half-­‐‑interest   in   the   income   of   the   partnership.    
See  Smith,  supra  note  21  at  38.  
   33.     Poe,  282  U.S.  at  108.  
   34.     Id.  at  109.  
   35.     Id.  at  111.  
   36.     Lawrence  Zelenak,  Marriage  and  the  Income  Tax,  67  S.  CAL.  L.  REV.  339,  345  
(1994).  
   37.     Id.    
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implement   such   property   laws.38      Consequently,   “confusion  
arose   as   to  when   a  married   couple   could   split   their   income.”39    
For  instance,  in  the  case  of  Commissioner  v.  Harmon,  the  Supreme  
Court   was   concerned   with   the   legality   of   the   community  
property   law   in  Oklahoma   that   had   been   enacted   shortly   after  
Seaborn.40    With  a  belief  that  it  would  collect  more  revenue,41  the  
states  permitted  married  couples  to  choose  between  following  a  
community   property   scheme   or   a   non-­‐‑community   property  
scheme.42      Relying   on   Lucas,   the   Court   noted,   “The   important  
fact  is  that  the  community  system  of  Oklahoma  is  not  a  system,  
dictated  by  State  policy,  as  an  incident  of  matrimony.”43    Finding  
that  the  elective  nature  of  the  system  was  improper,44  the  Court  
held  that  only  non-­‐‑elective  community  property  laws  incident  to  
marriage  could  permit  income  splitting.45  
Also   alarming  was   that   this   lack   of   conformity   among   the  
states   had   the   potential   to   put   married   couples   with   equal  
incomes   into  different   tax  brackets.46     The   resulting  disparity   is  
contradictory  to  the  Court’s  finding  that  there  is  a  constitutional  
requirement   for   geographic   uniformity   in   regards   to   federal  
taxation.47      Consequently,   in   1941   Congress   attempted   to  
 
   38.     Id.  
   39.       Milstein,  supra  note  17,  at  457-­‐‑58.  
   40.     Comm’r  v.  Harmon,  323  U.S.  44  (1944).  
   41.     Id.  at  44-­‐‑45.  
   42.     Id.    
   43.     Id.  at  48.  
   44.     Id.  at  47.  
   45.     Id.  
   46.     For   example,   assume  a  married   couple’s  only   income   is   $30,000   resulting  
from  the  husband’s  wages.    In  a  community  property  state,  each  spouse  could  file  a  
return   reporting   income   of   $15,000.      However,   in   a   separate   property   state,   the  
husband  would  have   to   file   a   tax   return   reporting   income  of  $30,000.     Due   to   the  
progressive  nature  of  tax  rates,  the  couple  in  the  community  property  state  would  
be  paying  a  lower  federal  tax  rate  than  the  couple  in  the  separate  property  state.  
   47.       Poe  v.  Seaborn,  282  U.S.  101,  117  (1930)  (internal  citations  omitted):  
Finally   the   argument   is   pressed  upon  us   that   the  Commissioner’s   ruling  
will  work  uniformity  of   incidence  and  operation  of  the  tax  in  the  various  
states,   while   the   view   urged   by   the   taxpayer   will   make   the   tax   fall  
unevenly   upon   married   people.   …   The   answer   to   such   argument,  
however,   is,   that   the   constitutional   requirement   of   uniformity   is   not  
intrinsic,  but  geographic.      
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implement   a   system   of   mandatory   joint   returns,   hoping   that  
such   a   system  would  prevent   the   residence  of   a   taxpayer   from  
being   a   factor   in   determining   one’s   tax   bill.48      The   House  
Committee   on   Ways   and   Means   recommended   that   Congress  
implement  a  system  in  which  a  married  couple  pays  tax  at  a  rate  
identical  to  that  of  a  single  person  with  the  same  income.49    The  
Committee’s  goal  in  the  implementation  of  such  a  system  was  to  
protect  horizontal  equity50  and  geographical  uniformity.51  
Although   Congress’   initial   efforts   in   1941   were  
unsuccessful,   the   legislative   branch   was   eventually   able   to  
resolve   the   issue  created  by   the  patchwork  nature  of   the  states’  
adoption   of   community   property   states.      To   eliminate   the  
geographic   disparity,   Congress   enacted   the   Revenue   Act   of  
1948.52      The  Act   allowed   all   couples   to   aggregate   their   income  
and  deductions  on  a  single   joint  return  and  “to  pay  a  tax  equal  
to   twice   what   a   single   person   would   pay   on   one-­‐‑half   their  
consolidated   taxable   income.”53      Specifically,   the   Act   allowed  
that   “[a]   husband   and   wife   may   make   a   single   return   jointly.    
Such  a  return  may  be  made  even  though  one  of  the  spouses  has  
neither  gross  income  nor  deductions.”54    Essentially,  this  created  
a   federally  adopted  community  property   system,  but  now  “the  
political  credit  for  reducing  taxes  was  concentrated  on  Congress  
rather   than  dispersed   among   the   state   legislatures.”55     Offering  
its   support,   the   Senate   Committee   explained   the   result   of   the  
Act:  
Adoption   of   these   income-­‐‑splitting   provisions   will  
produce   substantial   geographical   equalization   in   the  
impact   of   the   tax   on   individual   incomes.   The  
 
   48.     H.R.  REP.  NO.  77-­‐‑1040  (1941).  
   49.     Id.  at  69.  
   50.     Horizontal   equity   is   the   idea   that   married   couples   with   the   same   joint  
income  should  pay   tax  at  a   rate   identical   to   that  of  a  single  person  with   the  same  
income.    See  Milstein,  supra  note  17,  at  458.  
   51.     H.R.  REP.  NO.  77-­‐‑1040,  at  17  (1941).  
   52.     Smith,  supra  note  21,  at  39.  
   53.     Bittker,  supra  note  25,  at  1412-­‐‑13.  
   54.     Revenue  Act  of  1948,  Pub.  L.  No.  80-­‐‑471,  §  303,  62  Stat.  110,  115  (1948).  
   55.     Bittker,  supra  note  25,  at  1413.  
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impetuous   enactment   of   community-­‐‑property  
legislation   by   States   that   have   long   used   the   common  
law   will   be   forestalled.      The   incentive   for   married  
couples  in  common-­‐‑law  States  to  attempt  the  reduction  
of   their   taxes   by   the   division   of   their   income   through  
such   devices   as   trusts,   joint   tenancies,   and   family  
partnerships   will   be   reduced   materially.    
Administrative   difficulties   stemming   from   the   use   of  
such  devices  will  be  diminished,  and  there  will  be  less  
need   for   meticulous   legislation   on   the   income-­‐‑tax  
treatment  of  trusts  and  family  partnerships.56  
Finally,  in  1969,  reacting  to  their  belief  that  single  taxpayers  
were   being   overtaxed,57   Congress   created   the   current   system,  
IRC   Section   1,58   which   provided   five   different   tax   rate   tables.59    
To   eliminate   the   potential   over-­‐‑taxing   of   a   single   taxpayer,   the  
Tax  Reform  Act  of  1969  allowed  married  couples  to  file  separate  
returns.60      Feeling   that   married   taxpayers   who   elected   to   file  
separately   “should   have   their   own   tax   rate   providing   the   least  
favorable   rates,”61   the  Act   instituted   tax   rates   that  would   result  
in  “an  unmarried   individual   taxpayer   [   ]  never   [having   to]  pay  
more   than   120%   of   what   a   married   taxpayer   with   the   same  
income  would  pay,  while  setting  the  rates  for  married  taxpayers  
filing  separately  at  the  old  rate  for  unmarried  taxpayers.”62    This  
differential   rate   setting   “led   to   a  marriage   penalty,   in  which   a  
married  couple  with  two  earners  would  have  had  to  pay  higher  
taxes   than   they  would   if   they  had  never   been  married.”63      The  
United  States  Court  of  Appeals,  however,  upheld   the  ability  of  
Congress   to   set   differential   rates   based   on  marital   status.64      In  
 
   56.     S.  REP.  NO.  80-­‐‑1013,  at  1187  (1948).  
   57.     Smith,  supra  note  21,  at  40.  
   58.     I.R.C.  §  1  (2014).  
   59.     Id.  
   60.     Tax  Reform  Act  of  1969,  Pub.  L.  No.  91-­‐‑172,  83  Stat.  487  (1969).  
   61.     Smith,  supra  note  21,  at  40.  
   62.     Milstein,  supra  note  17,  at  460.  
   63.     Id.  
   64.     See  Druker  v.  Comm’r,  697  F.2d  46  (2d  Cir.  1982).    The  plaintiffs,  a  married  
couple   in  which   each   spouse   earned   income,   filed   their   taxes  under   the   “married  
filing  separately”  category.     Id.  at  47.     However,   the  tax  rates  applied  to  taxpayers  
filing  as  “married   filing   separately”  were  higher   than   those  applied   to  unmarried  
individuals.      Id.  Consequently,   the  Druker’s   filed   their   tax   returns  using   the   rates  
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Druker   v.   Commissioner,   the   court   reasoned,   “Congress   in   1969  
decided   to   hold   fast   to   horizontal   equity,   even   at   the   price   of  
imposing   a   ‘penalty’   on   two-­‐‑earner   married   couples   like   the  
Drukers.      There   is   nothing   in   the   equal   protection   clause   that  
required  a  different  choice.”65     Not  only  does   the  court’s   ruling  
reiterate   the   importance   of   horizontal   equity,   it   also   affirms  
Congress’  ability  to  afford  special  recognition  to  married  couples  
under  the  IRC.66  
The  current  federal   income  tax  allows  for  the   joint  filing  of  
returns   between   husband   and   wife.67      When   making   a   joint  
return,  “the  tax  shall  be  computed  on  the  aggregate  income  and  
the   liability  with  respect   to   the   tax  shall  be   joint  and  several.”68    
In   addition   to   their   eligibility   of   joint-­‐‑filing   status,   federally  
recognized  married   couples   are   viewed   differently   than   single  
taxpayers   in   various   provisions   throughout   the   IRC.      In   fact,  
marital   status   alone   can   subject   individual   taxpayers   to  
provisions   they   would   not   be   subjected   to   otherwise.    
Consequently,  the  Code’s  continual  reference  to  “spouse”  places  
both  benefits  and  burdens  on  married  taxpayers.69  
B.   BENEFITS  OF  SPOUSAL  RECOGNITION  
In   addition   to   joint-­‐‑filing   eligibility,   marital   recognition  
prescribes  myriad  benefits  upon  taxpayers.    For  instance,  legally  
married  taxpayers  can  freely  transfer  property  and  wealth  to  one  
another  without  the  imposition  of  income,  estate  and  gift  taxes.70    
A  non-­‐‑spouse  taxpayer,  however,  faces  marginal  tax  rates  on  the  
 
prescribed   to   unmarried   individuals.      Id.   Relying   on   their   finding   that   the   Equal  
Protection  Clause  did  not   require  a  different  choice,   the  Court  affirmed  Congress’  
ability  to  set  differential  rates  based  on  marital  status.    Id.  at  50.  
   65.     Druker,  697  F.2d  at  50.    
   66.     Id.  
   67.     I.R.C.  §  6013  (2014).  
   68.     I.R.C.  §  6013(d)(3)  (2014).  
   69.     Hayes,  supra  note  13,  at  1599-­‐‑1602.  
   70.     All   transfers   of   property   between   spouses   are   treated   as   a   gift.      I.R.C.   §  
1041(a)-­‐‑(b)   (2012).      Because   gifts   are   excluded   from   gross   income,   they   are   not  
subject  to  income  taxation.  I.R.C.  §§61,  63,  102(a)  (2014).  
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bequest   of   an   estate   that   exceeds   $5,250,000.71      Moreover,  
spouses   receive   certain   exclusion  benefits   from   the   gain   on   the  
sale  of  their  principal  residence.72    Legally  married  taxpayers  can  
also   receive   the   fringe   benefits   offered   by   their   spouse’s  
employer  without   the   imposition  of   income   taxes.73     Generally,  
such   fringe   benefits   include   health   insurance,74   employee  
discounts,75   and   even   tuition   discounts   at   educational  
institutions.76      Such   benefits,   of   course,   are   only   permitted   to  
married   taxpayers,   as   marriage   is   the   only   entity   eligible   to  
receive  spousal  treatment.77  
C.   BURDENS  ASSOCIATED  WITH  SPOUSAL  RECOGNITION  
Although   being   federally   recognized   as   married   provides  
an  array  of  benefits  to  eligible  taxpayers,  there  are  also  burdens  
that   individuals  will   face   as   a   result   of   their  marital   status.      In  
fact,  in  a  marriage  where  both  spouses  work  full  time,  they  will  
usually  pay  more  in  taxes  as  a  married  couple  than  they  would  if  
they   were   both   single.78      In   addition   to   the   potentially  
heightened   tax   liability   resulting   from   joint   filing,   the   IRC  
contains   certain   provisions   that   are   actually   burdensome   to  
 
   71.     Internal   Revenue   Service,   Instructions   to   Form   706,   INTERNAL   REVENUE  
SERVICE,  
http://www.irs.gov/instructions/i706/ch01.html#d0e120  (last  visited  Mar.  17,  2014).    
   72.     In   order   to   qualify   as   a   principal   residence,   the   taxpayer(s)   must   have  
occupied   the   residence   for   two  of   the  past   five  years  and   it  must  be  used  as   their  
primary  residence  (not  a  summer  or  weekend  home).    See  I.R.C.  §  121  (2014).  
   73.     The  ability  to  receive  a  spouse’s  fringe  benefits  is  currently  a  focal  point  in  
the  same-­‐‑sex  marriage  debate,  as  taxpayers  in  such  relationships  must  pay  federal  
taxes  on  the  portion  of  the  insurance  premium  that  was  paid  by  the  employer  as  a  
result   of   extending   coverage   to   employee’s   partner.  See  Movement  Advancement  
Project,  Family  Equality  Council,  &  Center  for  American  Progress,  Unequal  Taxation  
and  Undue  Burdens  for  LGBT  Families,  FAMILY  EQUALITY  COUNCIL,  Apr.  2012,  at  14,  
available   at   http://action.familyequality.org/site/DocServer/Unequal-­‐‑Taxation-­‐‑
Undue-­‐‑Burdens-­‐‑LGBT-­‐‑Families.pdf?docID=2881  (last  visited  Nov.  20,  2012).  
   74.     See  I.R.C.  §§  105,  106  (2014).  
   75.     See  I.R.C.  §  132(a)(1)-­‐‑(2),  (b),  (c)(1),  (h)(2)  (2014).  
   76.     See  I.R.C.  §  117(d)  (2014).  
   77.     Hayes,  supra  note  13,  at  1600-­‐‑1602.  
   78.     Zelenak,   supra   note   36   at   364.   The   likelihood   that  married   taxpayers  will  
pay   more   in   taxes   than   if   they   were   single   goes   to   the   concept   of   the   marriage  
penalty.    See  Milstein,  supra  note  17,  at  460.  
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married  taxpayers.    For  instance,  individuals  are  unable  to  claim  
a   loss   on   the   sale   or   exchange   of   property  when   it   is   between  
spouses.79      Section   267(a)   of   the   IRC   forbids   a   deduction   “[I]n  
respect   of   any   loss   from   the   sale   or   exchange   of   property,  
directly  or  indirectly  between”  spouses.80    Although  it  is  unlikely  
that   couples  will   consider   the   effects  of  various   IRC  provisions  
when  considering  a  legally  recognized  marriage,  the  creation  of  
such   can   unquestionably   subject   the   taxpayers   to   tax   related  
burdens.  
D.   GEOGRAPHIC  DISPARITY  STRIKES  BACK  
It   took   several   decades   for   the   legislative   and   executive  
branches   to   eliminate   the   unequal   tax   treatment   of   couples  
among   the   states.      Unfortunately,   the   problem   Congress  
purported  to  resolve  by  enacting  the  Revenue  Act  of  1948  is  now  
apparent  in  the  tax  treatment  of  many  same-­‐‑sex  unions.    In  fact,  
the  current  disparity  is  even  greater  than  that  of  the  community  
property  divide  in  the  early  1900s;  for,  not  only  is  there  a  lack  of  
uniformity   among   the   states,   but   because   the   federal  
government  refuses  to  recognize  non-­‐‑marital  relationships  there  
is   also   a   disparity   in   tax   treatment   of   the   couples   between   the  
state  and   federal   level.     As  articulated  by   the  Court   in  Poe,   this  
geographic   disparity   shall   not   be   tolerated,   as   there   is   a  
constitutional   requirement   for   geographic   uniformity   in   the  
operation  of  taxation  among  the  states.81    As  proposed  in  Part  VI  
of   this   Article,   in   order   to   maintain   the   constitutionally  
mandated   ideal   of   geographic   uniformity,   the   federal  
government   must   afford   non-­‐‑marital   relationships   in   broad  
recognition   states   the   same   benefits   and   burdens   afforded   to  
legally  recognized  married  couples.  
 
   79.     I.R.C.  §  267(a)(1)  (2012).  
   80.     Id.  
   81.     Poe  v.  Seaborn,  282  U.S.  101,  117  (1930).      
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III.  MARRIAGE  “EQUALITY”  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  
Over   the   past   several   decades,   members   of   the   gay  
community,  along  with  its  supporters,  have  advocated  for  equal  
rights.82     Conversely,   those   opposed   to   equal   rights   have  
advocated  keeping  marriage  between  a  man  and  a  woman.    The  
predominant  struggle  of   the  gay  rights  movement  has  been  the  
attempt  to  win  the  right  to  marriages  that  will  be  recognized  in  
both   the   civil   and   religious   society.83      The   year   1985  marked   a  
milestone   for   marriage   equality   when,   for   the   first   time,   a  
Supreme  Court   Justice   indicated   that  homosexuals  may  qualify  
as  a   suspect  class.84     Since   the  Court’s   ruling   in  1985,   the   rights  
afforded  to  same-­‐‑sex  partners  have  expanded,  with  some  states  
even   legally   recognizing   same-­‐‑sex   relationships.      However,  
despite   the   progress   of   the   gay   rights   movement,   there   is   still  
much   to   be   done,   even   in   areas  where   same-­‐‑sex   partners  may  
enter   into   legally   recognized   relationships.     With   a   number   of  
states  now  affording   rights   to   same-­‐‑sex  couples,  new  questions  
arise   as   to   where   individuals   in   these   relationships   fit   in   for  
purposes  of  the  IRC.  
 
   82.     See   PBS,   Timeline:   Milestones   in   the   American   Gay   Rights   Movement,   AM.  
EXPERIENCE,  
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/timeline/stonewall/   (last  
visited  Mar.  17,  2014).    
   83.     Hayes,  supra  note  13,  at  1594.  
   84.       Rowland  v.  Mad  River  Local  Sch.  Dist.,  Montgomery  Cnty.,  Ohio,  470  U.S.  
1009,  1014  (1985)  (Brennan,  J.,  dissenting):    
First,   homosexuals   constitute   a   significant   and   insular   minority   of   this  
country’s  population.     Because  of   the   immediate   and   severe  opprobrium  
often   manifested   against   homosexuals   once   so   identified   publicly,  
members   of   this   group   are   particularly   powerless   to   pursue   their   rights  
openly   in   the   political   arena.      Moreover,   homosexuals   have   historically  
been   the  object  of  pernicious  and   sustained  hostility,   and   it   is   fair   to   say  
that  discrimination  against  homosexuals  is  ‘likely  …  to  reflect  deep-­‐‑seated  
prejudice  rather  than  …  rationality.’  [  ]  State  action  taken  against  members  
of   such   groups   based   simply   on   their   status   as   members   of   the   group  
traditionally  has  been   subjected   to   strict,   or   at   least  heightened,   scrutiny,  
by  this  Court.    
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A.   THE  CONTINUED  ABILITY  OF  STATES  TO  REGULATE  
The  state  power  and  authority  over  marriage   is  one   that   is  
deeply   rooted   in   history   and   tradition.      For   over   one   hundred  
years   it   has   been   observed   that   “[t]he   whole   subject   of   the  
domestic   relations   of   husband   and   wife,   parent   and   child,  
belongs   to   the   laws   of   the   States   and   not   to   the   laws   of   the  
United  States.”85  As   stated  by   the  Supreme  Court   in  Haddock  v.  
Haddock,   “the   States,   at   the   time   of   the   adoption   of   the  
Constitution,  possessed   full  power  over   the  subject  of  marriage  
and  divorce  .  .  .  [T]he  Constitution  delegated  no  authority  to  the  
Government  of  the  United  States  on  the  subject  of  marriage  and  
divorce.”86  
Consequently,   in   remaining   consistent  with   this   allocation  
of  authority,  “the  Federal  Government,   throughout  our  history,  
has   deferred   to   state-­‐‑law   policy   decisions   with   respect   to  
domestic   relations.”87      Prior   to   the   congressional   enactment   of  
DOMA   in   1996,   the   federal   government   had   never   defined  
marriage.88      Rather,   such   definitions   were   determined  
respectively   amongst   the   states.      The   Court   in  United   States   v.  
Lopez   recognized   that   in   the   context   of   marriage,   states   have  
enjoyed   the   latitude   to   experiment   and   “exercise   their   own  
judgment  in  an  area  to  which  [they]  lay  claim  by  right  of  history  
and   expertise.”89      As   a   result   of   leaving   the   regulation   of  
marriage  to  the  states,  the  federal  government  has  “accepted  all  
state   marital   status   determinations   for   purposes   of   federal  
law.”90   By   granting   legal   recognition   to   non-­‐‑marital  
 
85.  In  re  Burrus,  136  U.S.  586,  593-­‐‑94  (1890).  See,  e.g.,  Mansell  v.  Mansell,  490  U.S.  
581,   587,   (1989)   (“[D]omestic   relations   are   preeminently   matters   of   state   law”);  
Moore  v.  Simms,  442  U.S.  415,  435  (1979)  (“Family  relations  are  a  traditional  area  of  
state  concern”).  
   86.     Haddock  v.  Haddock  201  U.S.  562,  575  (1906)  (overruled  on  other  grounds  
by  Williams  v.  North  Carolina,  317  U.S.  287  (1942)).  
   87.     U.S.    v.  Windsor,  570  U.S.  2675,  2691  (2013).  
   88.     Milstein,  supra  note  17,  at  481.  
   89.     United  States  v.  Lopez,  514  U.S.  549,  583  (1995)  (Kennedy,  J.,  concurring).  
   90.     See  Milstein,  supra  note  17,  at  462-­‐‑63  (comparing  this  concept  to  interracial  
marriages);  see  also  Massachusetts  v.  U.S.  Dept.  of  Health  and  Human  Services,  698  
F.  Supp.  2d  234,  237  (D.  Mass.  2010).    
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relationships,   a   state   proclaims   its   desire   to   treat   this   class   of  
persons   with   dignity   and   status.      Unfortunately,   however,  
without   federal   recognition   of   these   unions,   this   dignity   and  
status  is  compromised.  
B.   THE  ENACTMENT  OF  DOMA  
In   the   1970’s   there   were   a   handful   of   court   challenges  
regarding  the  definition  of  marriage.91    However,  it  was  not  until  
the   Hawaii   Supreme   Court   ruled   on   the   constitutionality   of  
same-­‐‑sex  marriage  that  the  issue  became  a  widespread  national  
concern.    In  Baehr  v.  Lewin92  the  Court  ruled  that  a  ban  on  same-­‐‑
sex   marriage   was   a   form   of   sex   discrimination,   and   therefore  
under   the  Hawaii   Constitution  was   entitled   to   strict   scrutiny.93    
Out   of   fear   that   states   would   begin   to   recognize   same-­‐‑sex  
marriages,94   Congress   was   spurred   to   action   by   the   Baehr  
decision.95      In   fact,   “[t]he  House   Judiciary   Committee’s   Report  
on  DOMA  [  ]  described  Baehr  as  [a].  .  .’legal  assault  being  waged  
against  traditional  heterosexual  marriage.’”96  
In  1996,  Congress  enacted  DOMA  to  “define  and  protect  the  
institution  of  marriage.”97    The  Act,  which  passed  both  houses  of  
Congress  by  a  large  margin—342  to  67  in  the  House98  and  85  to  
14   in  the  Senate99—was  then  signed  by  President  Bill  Clinton.100    
 
   91.     Lynn   D.   Wardle,   Who   Decides?   The   Federal   Architecture   of   DOMA   and  
Comparative  Marriage  Recognition,   41  CAL.  W.   INT’L  L.J.   143,   146   (2010);   see   JOANNA  
GROSSMAN  &  LAWRENCE  FRIEDMAN,   INSIDE  THE  CASTLE:  LAW  AND  THE  FAMILY   IN  
THE  20TH  CENTURY  AMERICA  142-­‐‑44  (2011).  
   92.     Baehr  v.  Lewin,  852  P.2d  44,  47  (Haw.  1993).      
   93.     Id.  at  67.    Baehr  concerned  three  same-­‐‑sex  couples  that  filed  suit  after  being  
denied   marriage   licenses.   Id.   at   49.      Petitioners   argued   that   the   state   had   acted  
unconstitutionally   because   the   state’s   constitution   contains   an   equal   rights  
provision  mandating  that  all  persons  should  be  given  equal  protection  of   the   law.    
Id.  at  50.  
   94.     Windsor  v.  U.S.,  699  F.3d  169,  191  (2d  Cir.  2012)  (Straub,  J.,  concurring).  
   95.     Id.  
   96.     Id.    
   97.     Defense   of   Marriage   Act.   Pub.   L.   No.   104-­‐‑199,   110   Stat.   2419   (1996)  
(codified  at  28  U.S.C.  §  178C  (2012)  and  1  U.S.C.  §  7  (2012)).  
   98.     142  CONG.  REC.  H74840-­‐‑05  (daily  ed.  July  12,  1996).  
   99.     142  CONG.  REC.  S10129-­‐‑01  (daily  ed.  Sept.  10,  1996).  
   100.     Wardle,  supra  note  90,  at  145.  
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On   its   face,   DOMA   had   two   operative   sections.      Section   2  
prevented   states   from   being   forced   to   recognize   same-­‐‑sex  
marriages  issued  in  other  states,101  while  Section  3  provided  the  
federal  definition  of  marriage  as  being  only  between  a  man  and  
a  woman.102  
A   horizontal   provision,103   Section   2   of   DOMA   essentially  
“amended   the   Full   Faith   and   Credit   Act   to   grant   states   the  
explicit   power   to   refuse   recognition   of   same-­‐‑sex   marriages.”104    
Consequently,  immediately  following  DOMA’s  enactment,  four-­‐‑
fifths  of  the  states  passed  statutes  or  constitutional  amendments  
banning   the   recognition   of   same-­‐‑sex   marriages.105      Section   3,  
however,  was   a   vertical   provision106   through  which   the   federal  
government  recognized  marriage  as  only  between  a  man  and  a  
woman.107      This   section   was   purported   to   “prevent   federal  
judges  and  agency  officials  from  using  federal  choice  of  law  and  
interpretative   principles   to   recognize   same-­‐‑sex   marriages   in  
federal  laws,  regulations,  and  programs  before  congress  decided  
such  recognition  was  appropriate.”108    Due  to  the  strict  definition  
provided   by   Section   3,   federal   officials   and   agencies   were   not  
forced   to   use   the   definition   of   marriage   in   states   that   have  
 
   101.     Id.    
No  State,  territory,  or  possession  of  the  United  States,  or  Indian  tribe,  shall  
be  required  to  give  effect  to  any  public  act,  record,  or   judicial  proceeding  
of  any  other  State,   territory,  possession,  or   tribe   respecting  a   relationship  
between  persons   of   the   same   sex   that   is   treated   as   a  marriage  under   the  
laws  of  such  other  State,  territory,  possession,  or  tribe,  or  a  right  or  claim  
arising  from  such  relationship.    
28  U.S.C.  §  1738C  (2012).  
   102.     Wardle,  supra  note  90,  at  145.  
   103.     Section   2   is   known   as   a   horizontal   provision   due   to   its   focus   on   the  
relationships  between  co-­‐‑equal  sovereign  states.    See  Wardle,  supra  note  90,  at  145.  
   104.     Grossman,   supra   note   90,   at   148.   However,   it   is   important   to   note   the  
argument   that   this   provision  was  not   necessary   in   order   for   states   to   reserve   this  
right,   as   full   faith   and   credit   has   never   been   understood   to   compel   interstate  
marriage  recognition.    Grossman,  supra  note  90,  at  149.  
   105.     Grossman,  supra  note  90,  at  149.  
   106.     Section   Three   is   known   as   a   vertical   provision   as   it   focuses   on   the  
relationship   between   the   national   government   and   the   states.      See   Wardle,   supra  
note  90,  at  147.  
   107.     Wardle,  supra  note  90,  at  145.  
   108.     Id.  at  147.  
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legalized   same-­‐‑sex  marriages.      Consequently   if   a   state   defined  
marriage   to   include   the   union   of   two   same-­‐‑sex   partners,   that  
definition   would   not   be   applied   when   interpreting   or  
administering   federal   programs   and   laws.      However,   this   all  
changed  on  June  26,  2013  when  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  
States   found  DOMA   unconstitutional,   as   a   “deprivation   of   the  
[equal]   liberty   of   [the]   persons   protected   by   the   Fifth  
Amendment.”109  
C.   WINDSOR  AND  THE  SUCCESSFUL  FIGHT  AGAINST  DOMA  
In  1993  Edith  Windsor  and  her  now-­‐‑deceased  spouse,  Thea  
Spyer   registered   as   domestic   partners   in  New  York  City.110      In  
2007,  Windsor  and  Spyer  were  married  in  Canada,  a  jurisdiction  
that   allows   same-­‐‑sex   marriages.111      Upon   Spyer’s   death   in  
February  2009,112  Spyer’s  estate  passed  to  Windsor,  as  prescribed  
in   Spyer’s   last  will   and   testament.113     However,   because   of   the  
operation   of   DOMA,   Windsor   was   ineligible   to   receive   the  
unlimited   marital   deduction   prescribed   by   26   U.S.C.   Section  
2056(a).114    Consequently,  Windsor  was  required  to  pay  $363,053  
in  federal  estate  taxes  on  the  estate  of  her   late  wife.115     Windsor  
then  brought   suit   seeking  a   refund  of   the   federal   taxes  paid  on  
the  estate,  declaring  that  Section  3  of  DOMA  violated  the  Equal  
Protection   Clause.116      Furthermore,   because   the   state   of   New  
York   had   endorsed   same-­‐‑sex   marriages   at   the   time   of   Spyer’s  
 
   109.     U.S.    v.  Windsor,  133  S.Ct.  2675,  2695  (2013).  
   110.     Windsor  v.  U.S.,  833  F.Supp.2d  394,  397  (S.D.N.Y.  2010).  
   111.     Id.  
   112.     Id.  
   113.     Id.  
  114.       I.R.C.  §  2056(a)  (2014):  
For  purposes  of  the  tax  imposed  by  section  2001,   the  value  of  the  taxable  
estate   shall,   except   as   limited   by   subsection   (b),   be   determined   by  
deducting  from  the  value  of  the  gross  estate  an  amount  equal  to  the  value  
of  any  interest  in  property  which  passes  or  has  passed  from  the  decedent  
to  his  surviving  spouse,  but  only  to  the  extent  that  such  interest  is  included  
in  determining  the  value  of  the  gross  estate.      
   115.     Windsor  v.  U.S.,  883  F.Supp.2d  394,  397  (S.D.N.Y.  2012).  
   116.     Windsor  v.  U.S.,  699  F.3d  169,  175-­‐‑76  (2d  Cir.  2012).      
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death,117   the  New  York  Attorney  General  brought  an  additional  
claim   that   Section   3   not   only   violated   the   Equal   Protection  
Clause,   but   that   it   also   violated   the   Tenth   Amendment’s  
protection  of  state  sovereignty.118  
Due   to   the   Executive   Branch’s   decision   not   to   enforce  
DOMA,119   the   Bipartisan   Legal   Advisory   Group   (BLAG)   was  
permitted   to   intervene   to   defend   the   constitutionality   of   the  
statute.120      BLAG  argued   that   the  House   Judiciary  Committee’s  
Report   on   DOMA   justified   the   Act,   as   advancing   government  
interests   “by   (1)   defending   and   nurturing   the   institution   of  
traditional,   heterosexual   marriage;   (2)   defending   traditional  
notions   of   morality;   (3)   protecting   state   sovereignty   and  
democratic   self-­‐‑governance;   and   (4)   preserving   scarce  
government   resources.”121      Relying   on   the   Supreme   Court’s  
decision   in  Baker  v.  Nelson,122  BLAG  argued   that  DOMA  was   in  
fact  constitutional,  and  that  Congress  had  the  ability  to  prohibit  
same-­‐‑sex   marriage   without   “offending   the   Equal   Protection  
 
   117.     Windsor,  833  F.Supp.2d  at  398.  
   118.     Id.  
   119.     In  June  2010,  President  Barack  Obama  issued  a  Presidential  Memorandum  
that   directed   federal   agencies   to   extend   benefits   to   same-­‐‑sex   partners   of   federal  
employees.  See  Press  Release,  Presidential  Memorandum-­‐‑  Extension  of  Benefits  to  Same-­‐‑
Sex   Domestic   Partners   of   Federal   Employees,   WHITE   HOUSE.GOV   (June   2,   2010)  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-­‐‑press-­‐‑office/presidential-­‐‑memorandum-­‐‑extension-­‐‑
benefits-­‐‑same-­‐‑sex-­‐‑domestic-­‐‑partners-­‐‑federal-­‐‑emplo.   Thereafter,   in   February   2011,  
United  States  Attorney  General  Holder  issued  a  statement  acknowledging  that  “the  
President   opposes   DOMA   and   believes   it   should   be   repealed.”   Press   Release,  
Statement   of   the  Attorney  General   on   Litigation   Involving   the  Defense   of  Marriage  Act,  
U.S.  DEP’T  OF  JUSTICE  (Feb.  23,  2011),  
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-­‐‑ag-­‐‑222.html.   On   that   very   same  
day,  Attorney  General  Holder  also  sent  a  letter  to  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  the  
United  States  House  of  Representatives  announcing  that  the  Department  of  Justice  
would  no  longer  defend  the  constitutionality  of  DOMA.    Press  Release,  Letter  from  
the  Attorney  General   to   Congress   on   Litigation   Involving   the  Defense   of  Marriage  Act.,  
U.S.  DEP’T  OF  JUSTICE  (Feb.  23,  2011),  
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-­‐‑ag-­‐‑223.html.  
   120.     Windsor,  833  F.Supp.2d  at  397.  
   121.     Windsor  v.  U.S.,  699  F.3d  169,  197-­‐‑98  (2d  Cir.  2012)  (quoting  H.R.  REP.  NO.  
106-­‐‑664,  at  3  (1996).    
   122.     Baker   v.   Nelson,   191   N.W.2d   185   (1971)   (holding   that   the   use   of   the  
traditional  definition  of  marriage   for  a   state’s  own  regulation  of  marriage  did  not  
violate  equal  protection).  
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Clause.”123      However,   the   district   court   found   persuading  
precedent   indicating   that   Baker   did   not   control   the   equal  
protection  review  of  DOMA.124  
“Equal   protection   requires   the   government   to   treat   all  
similarly   situated   persons   alike.”125      Moreover,   “The   ‘promise  
[of]  equal  protection  of   the   laws  must  coexist  with  the  practical  
necessity   that   most   legislation   classifies   for   one   purpose   or  
another,   with   resulting   disadvantage   to   various   groups   or  
persons.’”126    Generally,  legislation  is  presumed  to  be  valid  if  the  
classification   drawn   is   rationally   related   to   a   legitimate   state  
interest.127      However,   when   a   classification   is   not   “precisely  
tailored  to  serve  a  compelling  governmental  interest,”  the  court,  
using  strict  scrutiny,  may  find  that  it  violates  equal  protection.128    
Reasoning   that   DOMA   did   not   further   Congress’   goal   of  
promoting   the   traditional   institution   of   marriage,   the   U.S.  
District   Court   for   the   Southern  District   of  New  York   held   that  
DOMA   was   not   a   legitimate   method   for   promoting   or  
maintaining   consistency   in   marital   benefits   provided   by   the  
federal   government,   in   light   of   the   states’   role   in   regulating  
 
   123.     Windsor,  699  F.3d  at  178.      
   124.     See  Massachusetts  v.  U.S.  Dep’t  of  Health  and  Human  Services,  682  F.3d  1,  
8  (1st  Cir.  2012)  (finding  that  Baker  did  not  “rest  on  a  constitutional  right  to  same-­‐‑
sex   marriage”);   Windsor   v.   U.S.,   833   F.Supp.2d   394,   399-­‐‑400   (S.D.N.Y.   2012)  
(distinguishing   the   case   from  baker,   the  Court  wrote,   “The   case   before   the  Court  
does  not  present  the  same  issue  as  that  presented  in  Baker…  Accordingly  .   .   .      the  
Court   does   not   believe   that   Baker   ‘necessarily   decided’   the   question   of   whether  
DOMA   violates   the   Fifth   Amendment’s   Equal   Protection   Clause.”);   Pedersen   v.  
Office  of  Pers.  Mgmt.,  881  F.  Supp.  2d  294,  308   (D.  Conn.  2012)   (“DOMA  impacts  
federal  benefits  and  obligations,  but  does  not  prohibit  a   state   from  authorizing  or  
forbidding  same-­‐‑sex  marriage,  as  was  the  case  in  Baker.”);  Golniski  v.  U.S.  Office  of  
Pers.  Mgmt.,  824  F.  Supp.  2d  968,  982,  (N.D.  Cal.  2012)  (“The  failure  of  the  federal  
government  to  recognize  Ms.  Golinski’s  marriage  and  to  provide  benefits  does  not  
alter   the   fact   that   she   is   married   under   state   law.”);   Dragovich   v.   U.S.   Dept.   of  
Treasury,   872  F.   Supp.   2d   944,   952   (N.D.  Cal.   2012).     See   also   Perry  v.  Brown,   671  
F.3d  1052,  1082  (9th  Cir.  2012)  (finding  that  Baker  did  not  preempt  consideration  of  
Proposition  8  case,  because  “the  question  of  the  constitutionality  of  a  state’s  ban  on  
same-­‐‑sex  marriage”  was  not  before  the  court.).  
   125.     Windsor  v.  U.S.,  833  F.Supp.2d  394,  399-­‐‑400  (S.D.N.Y.  2012)  (Citing  City  of  
Cleburne  v.  Cleburne  Living  Ctr.,  473  U.S.  432,  439  (1985)).  
   126.     Windsor,  833  F.  Supp.  2d  at  400  (Quoting  Romer  v.  Evans,  517  U.S.  620,  631  
(1996)).  
   127.     Id.  at  400.  
   128.     Id.  
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domestic  relations,  and  that  Congress’  interest  in  conserving  the  
public   fisc   could   not   serve   the   purpose   alone.129      Finding   that  
DOMA  was  not  rationally  related  to  a  compelling  governmental  
interest,130   the   court   subjected   the   legislation   to   heightened  
scrutiny.131      Pursuant   to   the   principles   established   regarding  
strict  scrutiny,  the  court  found  that  Section  3  of  DOMA  did  not  
“pass  constitutional  muster.”132     Thereafter,  on  October  18,  2012  
the   United   States   Court   of   Appeals   for   the   Second   Circuit  
affirmed   the   District   Court’s   grant   of   motion   for   summary  
judgment.133    Finally,  on  June  26,  2013  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  
United  States  affirmed  the   judgment  of   the  United  States  Court  
of   Appeals   for   the   Second   Circuit,   finding   DOMA  
unconstitutional   as   a   “deprivation   of   the   [equal]   liberty   of   the  
person  protected  by  the  Fifth  Amendment.”134  
Due   to   the  Constitutional   guarantee   of   equality,   the  Court  
 
   129.     Id.  at  403-­‐‑06.  
   130.     Id.  at  403.  
   131.     Id.  at  402.  
   132.     Id.   The   court   reasoned,   “The   Supreme  Court’s   equal   protection   decisions  
have  increasingly  distinguished  between  ‘[l]aws  such  as  economic  or  tax  legislation  
that   are   scrutinized   under   rational   basis   review[,   which]   normally   pass  
constitutional  muster’,   and   ‘law[s   that]   exhibit[   ]…   a   desire   to   harm   a   politically  
unpopular  group,’  which  receive  ‘a  more  searching  form  of  rational  basis  review…  
under   the  Equal  Protection  Clause.”      Id.  Compare  Lawrence  v.  Texas,  539  U.S.  558,  
580  (2003)  (O'ʹConnor,  J.,  concurring)  ("ʺWhen  a  law  exhibits  such  a  desire  to  harm  a  
politically   unpopular   group,   we   have   applied   a   more   searching   form   of   rational  
basis  review  to  strike  down  such  laws  under  the  Equal  Protection  Clause."ʺ)  and  U.S.  
R.R.   Ret.   Bd.   v.   Fritz,   449  U.S.   166,   188   (1980)   (Brennan,   J.,   dissenting)   ("ʺIn   other  
cases,  however,  the  courts  must  probe  more  deeply."ʺ)  with  City  of  Cleburne,  Tex.  v.  
Cleburne  Living  Center,  473  U.S.  432,  459-­‐‑60  (1985)  (Marshall,  J.,  concurring  in  part  
and   dissenting   in   part)   ("ʺThe   refusal   to   acknowledge   that   something   more   than  
minimum   rationality   review   is   at   work   here   is,   in   my   view,   unfortunate....   [B]y  
failing   to   articulate   the   factors   that   justify   today'ʹs   'ʹsecond   order'ʹ   rational-­‐‑basis  
review,   the  Court  provides  no  principled   foundation   for  determining  when  more  
searching  inquiry  is  to  be  invoked."ʺ)  and  Mass.  Bd.  of  Ret.  v.  Murgia,  427  U.S.  307  ,  
321  (1976)  (Marshall,  J.,  dissenting)  ("ʺ[T]he  Court  has  rejected,  albeit  Sub  silentio,  its  
most   deferential   statements   of   the   rationality   standard   in   assessing   the   validity  
under  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  of  much  noneconomic  legislation."ʺ).  But  see  U.S.  
R.R.  Ret.  Bd.,  449  U.S.  at  176  n.10  ("ʺThe  comments  in  the  dissenting  opinion  about  
the  proper  cases  for  which  to  look  for  the  correct  statement  of  the  equal  protection  
rational-­‐‑basis   standard,   and   about   which   cases   limit   earlier   cases,   are   just   that:  
comments  in  a  dissenting  opinion."ʺ).  
   133.     Windsor  v.  U.S.,  699  F.3d  169,  188(2d  Cir.  2012).  
   134.     Windsor,  133  S.  Ct.  at  2695.  
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determined   that  disparate   treatment  of   same-­‐‑sex   couples   is  not  
justified   by   a   “bare   congressional   desire   to   harm   a   politically  
unpopular  group.”135    Finding  that  the  Federal  government  used  
DOMA  to   impose   restrictions  and  disabilities,136   the  Court   then  
addressed   whether   the   resulting   injury   and   indignity   was   a  
“deprivation  of  an  essential  part  of   the   liberty  protected  by   the  
Fifth  Amendment.”137     Concerned  with   the   fact   that   the   federal  
statute   seeks   to   “injure   the   very   class   New   York   seeks   to  
protect,”138   the   Court   refused   to   see   the   Act’s   purpose   as  
anything  but  discriminatory:  
The   history   of   DOMA’s   enactment   and   its   own   text  
demonstrate  that  interference  with  the  equal  dignity  of  
same-­‐‑sex  marriages,  a  dignity  conferred  by  the  States  in  
the  exercise  of  their  sovereign  power,  was  more  than  an  
incidental   effect   of   the   federal   statute.      It   was   its  
essence  .  .  .   The   stated   purpose   of   the   law   was   to  
promote  an  ‘interest  in  protecting  the  traditional  moral  
teachings  reflected  in  heterosexual-­‐‑only  marriage  laws.’    
Were  there  any  doubt  of  this  far-­‐‑reaching  purpose,  the  
title  of  the  Act  conforms  it:  The  Defense  of  Marriage.139  
Noting  that  “DOMA  writes  inequality  into  the  entire  United  
States  Code,”140  the  Court  dedicated  several  pages  of  its  opinion  
to   a   discussion   of   how   the   lack   of   federal   recognition  
incorporates   difficulties   and   indignity   not   just   to   same-­‐‑sex  
couples,  but   to   their   children,   families,   and   the   communities   in  
which   they   live   their  daily   lives.141     However,  as  a   result  of   the  
Court’s  ruling,  the  federal  government  will  no  longer  be  able  to  
refuse   to   recognize   same-­‐‑sex   marriages   in   the   states   that  
solemnize  such.    Consequently,  those  same-­‐‑sex  married  couples  
will  be  entitled  to  a  joint  filing  status  on  their  federal  income  tax  
return.     The  unknown,  however,   concerns   the   taxation  of   those  
same-­‐‑sex  partners  in  civil  unions  and  domestic  partnerships.    As  
 
   135.     Id.  at  2693.  (Quoting  Dep’t  of  Agric.  v.  Moreno,  413  U.S.  528,  534  (1973)).  
   136.     Id.  at  2692.  
   137.     Id.    
   138.     Id.  at  2693.  
   139.     Id.    
   140.     Id.  at  2694.    
   141.     Id.    
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the  Court  mentioned  in  Windsor,  the  integrity  and  closeness  of  a  
family   is   something   that   is   undermined   and   humiliated   when  
the  federal  government  refuses  to  recognize  what  some  view  as  
“second-­‐‑tier   marriages.”142      Unfortunately,   this   “diminishing  
stability   and   predictability”143  will   continue   to   burden   those   in  
non-­‐‑marital  relationships  unless  the  federal  government  extends  
to  them  some  type  of  legal  recognition.  
IV.  COMPARATIVE  ANALYSIS:  STATES’  RECOGNITION  OF  SAME-­‐‑
SEX  RELATIONSHIPS  AND  HOW  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM’S  
RECOGNITION  OF  SUCH  PROMOTES  CONSISTENCY  AND  
LEGISLATIVE  INTENT  
While   the  Windsor  decision  neither   legalized  nor  banned   same-­‐‑
sex   marriage   nationally,   there   continues   to   be   an   ever-­‐‑
progressing  method  of  recognition  of  same-­‐‑sex  relationships.    In  
2000,  Vermont  became   the   first   state   to  afford   legal   recognition  
to   same-­‐‑sex   relationships.144      Since   2000,   same-­‐‑sex   relationships  
have  been  afforded  recognition  by  a  growing  number  of  states.145    
The  scope  of  recognition,  however,   is  inconsistent  and  seems  to  
change  by  the  mere  crossing  of  state   lines,  a  situation  Congress  
specifically   sought   to   eradicate   when   revising   the   federal   tax  
regulations  in  the  1940s.146    For  instance,  some  states  allow  same-­‐‑
sex   couples   to  marry,  while   other   states   offer   other   recognized  
relationships   such   as   civil   unions   and   domestic   partnerships.    
Not  only  does  this  lack  of  uniformity  cause  inconsistency  among  
the   states,   but   as   discussed   in   Part  V   of   this  Article,   it   violates  
long-­‐‑standing  legislative  intent.  
A.   JURISDICTIONS  WITH  SAME-­‐‑SEX  MARRIAGES  
In   2003   Massachusetts   became   the   first   state   to   legalize  
 
   142.     Id.    
   143.     Id.    
   144.     VT.  STAT.  ANN.  tit.  15,  §§  1201-­‐‑1207  (2010).  (Enacted  in  response  to  Baker  v.  
Vermont,  744  A.2d  864,  886  (Vt.  1999)).  
   145.     See  discussion  infra  Part  IV.A-­‐‑C.  
   146.     H.R.  REP.  NO.  77-­‐‑1040  at  10,  17  (1941).  
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same-­‐‑sex   marriages   as   a   response   to   the   Supreme   Judicial  
Court’s  ruling  in  Goodridge  v.  Department  of  Public  Health.147    Since  
the  first  state   legalization  of  same-­‐‑sex  marriage,   the   legislatures  
of   several   other   states   have   begun   taking   initiatives   towards  
marriage   equality.      Currently,   seventeen   states   (California,148  
Connecticut,149   Delaware,150   Hawaii,151   Illinois,152   Iowa,153  
Maine,154   Maryland,155   Massachusetts,156   Minnesota,157   New  
Hampshire,158  New  Jersey,159  New  Mexico,160  New  York,161  Rhode  
Island,162   Vermont,163   and   Washington164)   and   the   District   of  
 
   147.     Goodridge   v.   Dep’t   of   Pub.   Health,   798   N.E.2d   941   (Mass.   2003).      The  
plaintiffs   in  Goodrich  were   a   group  of   same-­‐‑sex   couples   that   applied   for  marriage  
licenses  but  were  denied.    Id.  at  950.  The  plaintiffs  brought  a  claim  against  the  state  
arguing  that  this  denial  violated  their  constitutional  rights.    Id.  at  950.  The  Goodridge  
court   analyzed   the   constitutionality   of   the   denial   in   two   ways,   asking,   “Does   it  
offend  the  Constitution’s  guarantees  of  equality  before  the  law?     Or  do  the  liberty  
and  due  process  provisions  of  the  Massachusetts  Constitution  secure  the  plaintiffs’  
right   to   marry   their   chosen   partner?”   Id.   at   953.   Finding   that   denying   same-­‐‑sex  
couples   the   right   to   marry   is   unconstitutional,   the   court   held   same-­‐‑sex   couples  
would  no  longer  be  excluded  from  marriage  rights  under  Massachusetts  law.    Id.  at  
968.   In   their  advisory  opinion,   the  court   informed  the  senate   that  a  proposed  civil  
union   bill   “violates   the   equal   protection   and   due   process   requirements   of   the  
Constitution  of   the  Commonwealth  and  the  Massachusetts  Declaration  of  Rights,”  
for   it   “violates   the   basic   premises   of   individual   liberty   and   equality   under   law.”  
Majority  Opinion,  BOS.  GLOBE  (Feb.  3,  2004),  
http://www.boston.com/news/specials/gay_marriage/sjc_020404/.      Consequently,  
same-­‐‑sex   couples   could   no   longer   be   excluded   from   civil   rights   under  
Massachusetts  state  law.        
   148.       Perry  v.  Schwarzenegger,  704  F.Supp.2d  921  (N.D.Cal.  2010).  
   149.     2009  CONN.  ACTS  09-­‐‑13,  78-­‐‑79,  81  (Reg.  Sess.).      
   150.     H.R.  75,  147th  Gen.  Assemb.  (De.  2013).  
   151.     HAW.  REV.  STAT.,  §  572-­‐‑1.7,  1.8,  1.9  (2013).    
   152.     750  ILL.  COMP.  STAT.,  5/212  (effective  date  June  1,  2014).    
   153.     Varnum  v.  Brien,  763  N.W.  2d  862,  907  (Iowa  2009).  
   154.     ME.  REV.  STAT.  tit.  23  §  650-­‐‑A  (2013);  see  also  David  Sharp,  Main’s  Same-­‐‑Sex  
Marriage   Law   Goes   Into   Effect,   HUFFINGTON   POST   (Dec.   29,   2012),  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/29/maines-­‐‑same-­‐‑sex-­‐‑marriage-­‐‑
_n_2380334.html.    
   155.     MD.  CODE  ANN.,  FAM.  LAW  §  2-­‐‑201  (LexisNexis  2012).  
   156.     Goodridge,  798  N.E.  2d  at  968.  
   157.     MINN.  STAT.  §  517.01  (2013).    
   158.     N.H.  REV.  STAT.  ANN.  §  457:1-­‐‑a  (2013).  
   159.     N.J.  STAT.  ANN.  §37:  1-­‐‑31  (West  2013).  
   160.     Griego  v.  Oliver,  316  P.3d  865  (N.M.  2013).  
   161.     N.Y.  DOM.  REL.  LAW  §  10(a)  (Consol.  2013).  
   162.     R.I.  GEN.  LAWS  §  15-­‐‑1-­‐‑1  (2013).  
   163.     VT.  STAT.  ANN.  tit.  15,  §  8  (2010).    
   164.     WASH.  REV.  CODE  §  26.04.010  (2012).  
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Columbia165   allow  marriages   between   same-­‐‑sex   partners.166      In  
most   of   these   jurisdictions,   as   discussed   infra   in   Part   IV   of   this  
Article,   same-­‐‑sex   couples   are   recognized   as   married   and  
therefore   receive  all  of   the  marital  benefits   that  are  available   to  
opposite-­‐‑sex   married   couples.167      Due   to   such   recognition,  
parties  in  same-­‐‑sex  marriages  are  not  only  eligible  to  receive  the  
same  state   issued  benefits   as  opposite-­‐‑sex  married  couples,  but  
in  a  majority  of  these  states  they  are  also  able  to  jointly  file  their  
state  income  tax  returns.  
B.   JURISDICTIONS  WITH  NON-­‐‑MARITAL  RELATIONSHIPS  
Even  if  a  state  does  not  recognize  same-­‐‑sex  marriages,  there  
are  alternative  ways   in  which   the   legislature  can  prescribe  civil  
rights  to  those  in  same-­‐‑sex  relationships.    Generally,  non-­‐‑marital  
recognition   is   granted   through   a   civil   union   or   domestic  
partnership.168      States   that   recognize   non-­‐‑marital   relationships  
have   greatly   varying   definitions   of   such,   the   implications   of  
which  differ  from  state  to  state.     For  example,  Colorado  affords  
same-­‐‑sex  partners  a  very  limited  set  of  rights  via  its  recognition  
of  a  “designated  beneficiary.”169    Such  limited  rights  include  the  
ability   to  serve  as   the  beneficiary  of  a  non-­‐‑probate   transfer  and  
the  right  of  survivorship  as  tenants  in  common.170  
Although   a   state’s   recognition   of   non-­‐‑marital   relationships  
certainly  affords   some   rights   to   the   individuals   in   such  unions,  
there  continues  to  be  confusion  as  to  the  exact  function  of  a  civil  
 
   165.     Religious  Freedom  and  Civil  Marriage  Equality  Amendment  Act  of   2009,  
57  D.C.  REG.  (Dec.  18,  2009),  available  at  
http://www.dcregs.org/Gateway/NoticeHome.aspx?noticeid=114380.  
   166.     Freedom  to  Marry,  Inc.,  Where  State  Laws  Stand,  FREEDOM  TO  MARRY,  
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/where-­‐‑state-­‐‑laws-­‐‑stand   (last   visited   Jan.   1,  
2013).  
   167.     See   Edward   Stein,   The   Topography   of   Legal   Recognition   of   Same-­‐‑Sex  
Relationships,  50  FAM.  CT.  REV.  181  (2012).    
   168.     Id.   at   181   (Indicating   that   Nevada   and   Oregon   recognize   domestic  
partnerships);   Freedom   to   Marry,   Inc.,   States,   FREEDOM   TO   MARRY,  
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/   (last   visited  Apr.   19   2014)   (indicating   that  
Colorado  recognizes  civil  unions).    
   169.     COLO.  REV.  STAT.  §  15-­‐‑22-­‐‑105  (2009).  
   170.     Id.  
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union   or   domestic   partnership   and   how   these   recognized  
relationships   differ   from   a   traditional   marriage.      While   some  
believe   that   non-­‐‑marital   relationships   are   an   efficient   way   of  
“protecting”   traditional   marriages,171   others   believe   that   the  
mere   difference   in   title   subjects   those   in   non-­‐‑marital  
relationships  to  second-­‐‑class  recognition.172  
Although   the   overturning   of   DOMA   allows   same-­‐‑sex  
married   couples   to   receive   spousal   recognition   by   the   IRS,  
individuals   in   non-­‐‑marital   relationships   continue   to   experience  
inconsistent   treatment   in   regards   to   the  way   in  which   they   are  
taxed.     While  at   first  glance  many  would  argue   that   these  non-­‐‑
marital  relationships  should  not  be  afforded  marital  recognition  
by   the   IRS—for  even   the  name   itself   indicates   that   they  are  not  
marriages—the  way  in  which  these  unions  are  recognized  by  the  
 
   171.     See   Elizabeth  M.  Glazer,  Civil  Union   Equality,   CARDOZO   L.   REV.   DE   NOVO  
125,  132,  143  (2012).  
   172.     The  U.S.  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Ninth  Circuit  colorfully  exemplifies  the    
significant  symbolic  disparity  between  domestic  partnerships  and  marriage,  stating:  
We  need  consider  only   the  many  ways   in  which  we  encounter   the  word  
‘marriage’   in   our   daily   lives   and   understand   it,   consciously   or   not,   to  
convey  a  sense  of  significance.    We  are  regularly  given  forms  to  complete  
that   ask   us   whether   we   are   “single”   or   “married.”      Newspapers   run  
announcements   of   births,   deaths,   and  marriages.     We   are   excited   to   see  
someone   ask,   “Will   you   marry   me?”,   whether   on   bended   knee   in   a  
restaurant   or   in   text   splashed   across   a   stadium   Jumbotron.      Certainly   it  
would   not   have   the   same   effect   to   see   “Will   you   enter   into   a   registered  
domestic  partnership  with  me?    Groucho  Marx’s  one-­‐‑liner,  “Marriage  is  a  
wonderful   institution…  but  who  wants   to   live   in   an   institution?”  would  
lack   its   punch   if   the  word   ‘marriage’  were   replaced  with   the   alternative  
phrase.    So  too  with  Shakespeare’s  “A  young  man  married  is  a  man  that’s  
marr’d,”   Lincoln’s   “Marriage   is   neither   heaven   nor   hell,   it   is   simply  
purgatory,”   and   Sinatra’s   “A  man  doesn’t   know  what   happiness   is   until  
he’s  married.    By  then  its  too  late.”    We  see  tropes  like  “marrying  for  love”  
versus  “marrying  for  money”  played  out  again  and  again  in  our  films  and  
literature   because   of   the   recognized   importance   and   permanence   of   the  
marriage   relationship.      Had   Marilyn   Monroe’s   film   been   called  How   to  
Register   a   Domestic   Partnership   with   a   Millionaire,   it   would   not   have  
conveyed   the   same  meaning   as   did   her   famous  movie,   even   though   the  
underlying   drama   for   same-­‐‑sex   couples   is   no   different.      The   name  
‘marriage’   signifies   the   unique   recognition   that   society   gives   to  
harmonious,   loyal,   enduring,   and   intimate   relationships.      See   Knight   v.  
Super.  Ct.,  128  Cal.  App.  4th  14,  31  (2005)  See  Knight  v.  Super.  Ct.,  26  Cal.  
Rptr.3d   687   (2005).   (“[M]arriage   is   considered   a   more   substantial  
relationship   and   is   accorded   a   greater   stature   than   a   domestic  
partnership.”)    
Perry  v.  Brown,  671  F.3d  1052,  1078  (9th  Cir.  2012).  
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respective  states,  in  tandem  with  the  rights  afforded  to  them  by  
such,   lies  at  the  very  heart  of  this  Article.     As  discussed   infra   in  
Part  VI  of   this  Article,  although   these  non-­‐‑marital   relationships  
are   not   given   the   title   “marriage,”   the   identical   treatment   of  
such,   coupled  with   the   lack  of   federal   recognition,   continues   to  
foster  in  the  lack  of  geographic  uniformity  and  horizontal  equity  
that  remains  a  Congressional  aim  in  the  area  taxation.     In  order  
to  analyze  which  states’  non-­‐‑marital  relationships  the  IRS  should  
recognize,   this  Article  will  divide   the  applicable  states   into   two  
categories:   states   with   broad   recognition   laws   and   states   with  
limited   recognition   laws.      This   classification   of   recognition   is  
necessary  in  order  to  fully  understand  which  states’  non-­‐‑marital  
relationships   should  be   recognized  by   the   IRS   in  order   to  meet  
the   congressional   aims   of   horizontal   equity   and   geographic  
uniformity.  
1.   States  with  Broad  Recognition  Laws  
A  broad  relationship   recognition   law  “extends   to   same-­‐‑sex  
couples  all  or  nearly  all   the  rights  and  responsibilities  extended  
to  married  couples  under  state  law,  whether  titled  a  ‘civil  union’  
or   ‘domestic   partnership’   law.”173      The   majority   of   states   that  
provide  non-­‐‑marital  recognition  to  same-­‐‑sex  couples  afford  such  
relationships  with  rights,  benefits  and  duties  equivalent  to  those  
afforded   to  married  couples,   and   therefore,   for   the  purposes  of  
this   Article,   will   be   considered   states   with   broad   recognition  
laws.  
  Vermont  was  the  trendsetter  for  this  approach,  as  it  was  the  
first   state   to   offer   same-­‐‑sex   couples   benefits   identical   to   those  
prescribed  by  marriage.174    In  Baker  v.  State,  the  Supreme  Court  of  
Vermont   held   that   the   state   was   “constitutionally   required   to  
extend   same-­‐‑sex   couples   the   common   benefits   and   protections  
 
   173.     Relationship  Recognition  for  Same-­‐‑Sex  Couples  in  the  U.S.,  NATIONAL  GAY  AND  
LESBIAN  TASK  FORCE  (Jan.  6,  2014),  
http://www.thetaskforce.org/reports_and_research/relationship_recognition.    
   174.     Smith,  supra  note  21,  at  56.      
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that   flow   from   marriage   under   Vermont   law.”175      The   court  
essentially  gave  the  state  government  two  options:  either  extend  
marriage   to   same-­‐‑sex   couples,   or   create   a   “parallel   ‘domestic  
partnership’   system   or   some   equivalent   statutory   alternative,  
rests   within   the   Legislature.”176      Consequently,   the   Vermont  
legislature   enacted   laws   creating   civil   unions   for   same-­‐‑sex  
partners,177   resulting   in   the   extension   of   “all   the   same   benefits,  
protections,  and  responsibilities  under  law,  whether  they  derive  
from   statute,   administrative   or   court   rule,   policy,   common   law  
or  any  other   source  of   civil   law,  as   are  granted   to   spouses   in  a  
civil  marriage.”178  
A  majority   of   the   states   that   offer   non-­‐‑marital   relationship  
recognition   follow   Vermont’s   approach   in   treating   the  
relationships  as  marriage  equivalents.    In  following  the  Vermont  
approach,   states   such   as   California,179   Hawaii,180   Illinois,181   and  
Oregon182   give   non-­‐‑marital   relationships   the   same   rights   and  
duties  prescribed  to  marriages.    The  majority  of  the  these  broad  
recognition   states   extend   to   same-­‐‑sex   partners   rights   such   as  
property   interest,   protections   such   as   the   marital  
communications   privilege,   and   benefits   such   as   worker’s  
compensation.183      Moreover,   as   discussed   in   Part   V   of   this  
 
   175.     Baker   v.   Vermont,   744   A.2d   864,   867   (Vt.   1999).      It   is   worth   noting   that  
several  years  later,  Vermont  enacted  legislation  affording  legal  to  same-­‐‑sex  married  
couples.    S.  115  Reg.  Sess.  (Vt.  2009);  VT.  STAT.  ANN.  tit.  32,  §  5861  (2013).  
   176.     Id.  
   177.     VT.  STAT.  ANN.  tit.  15  §§  1201-­‐‑07  (2010).  
   178.     VT.  STAT.  ANN.  tit.  15  §  1204(a)  (2010).  
   179.     See  CAL.  FAM.  CODE  §  297.5  (2003).      It   is   important   to  note  that  while   this  
Note  was   being  written,   the   Supreme   Court   of   the   United   States   issued   a   ruling  
regarding   the   constitutionality   of   Proposition   8,   an   initiative   constitutional  
amendment   that   eliminated   the   right   of   same-­‐‑sex   couples   to  marry   in  California.    
Hollingsworth  v.  Perry,  133  S.Ct.  2652,  2659  (2013).    Finding  that  the  supporters  of  
the  ban  on  gay  marriage  did  not  have   standing,   the  decision  of   the  United  States  
District  Court  for  the  Ninth  Circuit  will  be  upheld,  and  therefore  “all  persons  under  
[California  officials’]  control  or  supervision”  shall  not  enforce  Proposition  8.    Perry  
v.   Brown,   671   F.3d   1052,   1069   (9th   Cir.   2012).      However,   the   fate   of   the   state’s  
recognition  of  domestic  partnerships  is  unknown,  and  therefore  California  has  been  
included  in  the  category  of  states  with  broad  recognition  laws.        
   180.     See  2011  Haw.  Sess.  Laws.  232,  ch.  1,  §  9.  
   181.     See  750  ILL.  COMP.  STAT.  ANN.  75/20  (2013).  
   182.     See  OR.  REV.  STAT.  §  106.340  (2009).  
   183.     See  infra  notes  185-­‐‑189  and  accompanying  text.    
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Article,  many  of  the  states  with  broad  recognition  laws  treat  the  
couples  as  marriages  for  purposes  of  state  taxation.  
Arguably,   there   is  one  other   state   that   can  be  considered  a  
broad  recognition  state:  Nevada.184  The  Nevada  law  differs  from  
the  Vermont  approach  in  that  domestic  partners  “have  the  same  
rights,   protections   and   benefits,   and   are   subject   to   the   same  
responsibilities,  obligations  and  duties.  .  .   as  are  granted   to  and  
imposed  upon   spouses.”185     However,   the   statue   also   expresses  
that   private   employers   are   not   required   to   provide   health   care  
benefits   to   an   employee’s   domestic   partner.186      The   limited  
nature  of  Nevada’s   constitutional   exclusion  does  not  prevent   it  
from   being   classified   as   broad   recognition   states   for   the  
purposes  of  this  Article,  as  non-­‐‑marital  relationships  in  the  state  
are  afforded  the  majority  of  rights  assigned  to  married  couples,  
most  notably  spousal  recognition  for  state  tax  purposes.  
2.   States  with  Limited  Recognition  Laws  
States  with  limited  recognition  laws  do  recognize  same-­‐‑sex  
non-­‐‑marital  relationships  but  the  rights  extended  to  such  unions  
are  extremely  limited  compared  to  those  extended  to  couples  in  
states  with  broad  recognition  laws.    While  this  Article  was  being  
written   two   states   (Maine   and   Maryland),   which   would   have  
been   considered   limited   recognition   states,   actually   granted  
recognition  to  same  sex  marriages  via  ballot  referendums  in  the  
November   2012   election.187      Consequently,   there   are   only   two  
 
   184.     Rhode   Island   would   also   arguably   have   been   considered   a   broad  
recognition   state.      However,   during   the   writing   of   this   Note   the   State   enacted  
legislation   legalizing  same-­‐‑sex  marriages.     R.I.  GEN.  LAWS  §  15-­‐‑1-­‐‑1   (2013).  Prior   to  
this   newly   enacted   legislation,   Rhode   Island   same-­‐‑sex   civil   unions,   in   which  
individuals   would   receive   all   the   same   “rights,   benefits,   protections,   and  
responsibilities”   as   those  married   under   Rhode   Island   law,   except   that   it   did   not  
require  religious  organizations  to  recognize  such  unions.    See  R.I.  GEN.  LAWS  §  §  15-­‐‑
3.1-­‐‑6.  15-­‐‑3.1-­‐‑5  (2013).  
   185.     NEV.  REV.  STAT.  §  122A.200(1)(2013).  
   186.     Id.    
   187.     Erik  Eckholm,  In  Maine  and  Maryland,  Victories  at  the  Ballot  Box  for  Same-­‐‑Sex  
Marriage,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Nov.  7,  2012,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/07/us/politics/same-­‐‑sex-­‐‑marriage-­‐‑voting-­‐‑
election.html?_r=0.  
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states   (Colorado   and   Wisconsin)   that   recognize   non-­‐‑marital  
relationships   that,   for   the   purpose   of   this  Article,   have   limited  
recognition  laws.188    However,  because  thirty  states  have  enacted  
Constitutional   amendments   to   specifically   define   marriage   as  
between   a   man   and   a   woman,189   and   the   amendments   in  
nineteen   of   these   thirty   states   also   expressly   prohibit  marriage  
equivalent   non-­‐‑marital   relationships),190   there   is   no   doubt   that  
the   existence   of   limited   recognition   laws   will   continue,   if   not  
increase.  
Colorado  does  not  recognize  non-­‐‑marital  relationships,  but  
rather   extends   limited   rights   to   same-­‐‑sex   couples   via   its   use   of  
designated   beneficiaries.191      Colorado’s   Designated   Beneficiary  
Agreement  Act192  allows  two  unmarried  adults  to  designate  one  
another   as   beneficiaries.193      As   a   designated   beneficiary,   an  
individual  will  have  the  ability  to  serve  a  conservator,  guardian,  
dependent   and   even   beneficiary.194      However,   designated  
beneficiaries  are  not  recognized  for  all  other  state  purposes  and  
consequently  are  not  able   to   receive   the   spousal  benefits  under  
the  Colorado  system  of  taxation.195  
Unlike   Colorado,   Wisconsin   does   recognize   non-­‐‑marital  
relationships.196      In   2009,   the   Wisconsin   legislature   enacted   a  
domestic   partnership   law,   providing   limited   rights   and  
protections   to   same-­‐‑sex   couples.197      Not   only   is   the   2009  
enactment   limited   in   nature,   but   Wisconsin   also   has   a  
constitutional   amendment   through   which   the   state   refuses   to  
recognize   same-­‐‑sex   marriages   and   other   relationships   that   are  
“identical   or   substantially   similar”   to   marriage.198      Due   to   the  
 
   188.     See  COLO.  REV.  STAT.  §  15-­‐‑22-­‐‑105  (2013);  WIS.  STAT.  §  770.001  (2009).  
   189.     Wardle,  supra  note  90,  at  161.  
   190.     Id.  
   191.     See  COLO.  REV.  STAT.  §  15-­‐‑22-­‐‑105  (2013).  
   192.     Id.  
   193.     Id.  
   194.     Id.    
   195.     Id.  
   196.     WIS.  STAT.  §§  770.001,  770.01(2)  (2009).  
   197.     WIS.  STAT.  §  770.001  (2009).  
   198.     See  WIS.  CONST.  art.  XIII,  §  13.  (Editor’s  note:  As  this  Article  was  going  to  print,  
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strict  constraints  of  the  constitutional  amendment,  coupled  with  
the   limited   nature   of   Wisconsin’s   statute   allowing   domestic  
partnerships,  those  in  same-­‐‑sex  non-­‐‑marital  relationships  are  not  
afforded  rights  similar  to  those  married  under  state  law.    In  both  
Colorado   and  Wisconsin,   same-­‐‑sex   couples   do   not   receive   the  
same  benefits,   rights,  or   recognition   that   is  afforded   to  married  
couples.      Consequently,   as   proposed   in   Part   V   of   this   Article,  
non-­‐‑marital  relationships   in   these   two  states  should  not  receive  
spousal  recognition  from  the  federal  government.  
C.   STATES’  TAXATION  OF  NON-­‐‑MARITAL  RELATIONSHIPS  
Currently,   all   states   with   income   taxes   allow   for   the   joint  
filing   of   state   income   tax   returns   by   husbands   and   wives.199    
Moreover,  all  such  states  have  filing  statuses  identical  to  those  of  
the   federal   government:   single,   head   of   household,   married  
filing   separately,   and   married   filing   jointly.200      What   is   not   so  
cohesive,   however,   is   the  way   the   states   tax   same-­‐‑sex  married  
couples  and  other  non-­‐‑marital  relationships.    Although  there  is  a  
lack   of   uniformity   among   the   states   regarding   the   taxation   of  
same-­‐‑sex  relationships,  there  is  one  factor  that  is  dispositive  for  
the  sake  of  this  analysis:  the  states  intent,  or  lack  thereof,  to  treat  
the  relationship  as  a  marriage  equivalent.  
Of   the   eighteen   jurisdictions   that   recognize   same   sex-­‐‑
marriages201,   fifteen   of   them   tax   such  marriages   the   same  way  
they  tax  opposite-­‐‑sex  marriages.    These  fourteen  jurisdictions  are  
California,   Connecticut,   Delaware,   Hawaii,   Iowa,   Illinois,  
Massachusetts,   Maryland,   New   Hampshire,   New   Jersey,   New  
York,   Oregon,   Vermont,   Rhode   Island,   and   the   District   of  
Columbia.202      In   all   of   these   jurisdictions,   the   revenue  
 
Wisconsin’s  ban  on  same  sex  marriage  was  deemed  unconstitutional)  
   199.     Smith,  supra  note  21,  at  40.  
   200.     Id.  
   201.     Id.  at  48-­‐‑49  n.65.  
   202.     Id.  at  48-­‐‑49  (Oregon  recognizes  only  legal  out  of  state  same-­‐‑sex  marriages);  
Comptroller   of   Md.,   Frequently   Asked   Questions   About   Income   Tax,   SPOTLIGHT   ON  
MD.  TAXES  (2014),  
http://taxes.marylandtaxes.com/Resource_Library/Taxpayer_Assistance/Frequently
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departments  have  announced  that  despite  their  inability  to  do  so  
on   the   federal   level,   legally   recognized   same-­‐‑sex   couples   may  
file   joint   state   income   tax   returns.203     Of   course,   it   comes   as   no  
surprise  that  these  states  allow  same-­‐‑sex  married  couples  to  file  
jointly,  as  such  eligibility  is  consistent  with  each  states’  intent  to  
treat  such  relationships  as  marriage  equivalents.  
Washington   recognizes   same-­‐‑sex   marriages   but   is   not  
included   in   this   group.      Washington   is   the   only   state   that  
solemnizes   same-­‐‑sex   marriages   that   does   not   have   a   state  
income   tax,204   and   therefore   the   state   is   not   going   against   its  
statutory  intent  of  treating  same-­‐‑sex  married  couples  in  the  same  
manner  as  different-­‐‑sex  married  couples.  
Additionally,   there   are   six   states   with   non-­‐‑marital  
recognition   laws   that   appear   broad   enough   to   treat   same-­‐‑sex  
couples   as   married   for   the   purpose   of   state   taxation.      These  
states  are  Hawaii,   Illinois,  California,  Oregon,  and  Nevada.     Of  
these  states,  only  Illinois,205  Hawaii,206  California207  and  Oregon208  
have   announced   that   same-­‐‑sex   non-­‐‑marital   couples   may   file  
joint   returns.      Like  Washington,  Nevada   does   not   have   a   state  
income   tax   and   therefore   its   lack   of   a   statement   regarding  
marital  recognition  for  taxation  is  irrelevant.209  
 
_Asked_Questions/Individual_Tax_FAQs/Income_Tax_FAQs/q29.shtml.    
   203.     Id.      
   204.     Although   Washington   does   not   have   a   state   income   tax,   it   has   what   is  
known   as   a   Business   and  Occupation   Tax.      The   Business   and  Occupation   Tax   is  
calculated  based  on  gross   receipts,   rather   than  net   income.     Although   individuals  
whose  business  is  in  the  form  of  a  sole  proprietorship  may  be  subject  to  the  tax,  the  
state   does   not   allow   joint   filing   of   such   returns   by   spouses.      See   Business   &  
Occupation  Tax,  WASH.  STATE  DEP’T  OF  REVENUE,  
http://dor.wa.gov/content/FindTaxesAndRates/BAndOTax/.  
   205.     Same-­‐‑Sex  Civil  Unions,  ILL.  REVENUE,  
http://tax.illinois.gov/Individuals/FilingRequirements/FilingStatus.htm   (last   visited  
Mar.  17,  2014).  
   206.     Attorney   General   Opinions,   HI   DEP’T   OF   TAXATION,  
http://tax.hawaii.gov/legal/a4_6agop/  (last  visited  Mar.  17,  2014).  
   207.     What  if  I’m  a  Domestic  Partner?,  CAL.  FRANCHISE  TAX  BD.,  
https://www.ftb.ca.gov/individuals/faq/dompart.shtml  (last  visited  Mar.  17,  2014).  
   208.     Registered  Domestic  Partners  in  Oregon,  DEP’T  OF  REVENUE,  
http://www.oregon.gov/dor/pertax/pages/rdp.aspx#Introduction   (last   visited   Mar.  
17,  2014).  
   209.     Smith,  supra  note  21,  at  46.  
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Conversely,   as   limited   recognition   states,   the   non-­‐‑marital  
legislation   of   neither   Colorado   nor   Wisconsin   have   the  
purported   intent  of   treating   same-­‐‑sex   couples   equal   to  married  
couples.      Consequently,   parties   in   non-­‐‑marital   relationships   in  
these   states   are   not   able   to   jointly   file   their   state   income   tax  
returns,  nor  are  they  subject  to  the  benefits,  rights,  and  burdens  
associated  with  marital  status  in  regards  to  taxation.    As  Part  VI  
of  this  Article  suggests,  non-­‐‑marital  relationships  in  these  states  
should   not   be   recognized   as   marital   equivalents,   as   doing   so  
would  be  inconsistent  with  the  legislative  intent.    All  states  that  
recognize   same-­‐‑sex   marriages   or   that   have   broad   recognition  
laws  treat  such  couples  equal  to  married  couples  for  the  purpose  
of  state  income  taxation.    As  discussed  in  Part  VI  of  this  Article,  
a   state’s   purported   intent   of   equal   recognition   should   be   the  
determining   factor   in   deciding   whether   or   not   the   federal  
government   should   recognize   the   state’s   treatment   of   same-­‐‑sex  
couples.  
  
D.   FOREIGN  NATIONS’  RECOGNITION  AND  TAXATION  OF  NON-­‐‑
MARITAL  SAME-­‐‑SEX  RELATIONSHIPS  
The   assignment   of   marital   rights   to   same-­‐‑sex   couples   is   a  
large   area   of   contention   in   not   just   the   United   States,   but  
essentially   in   a  majority   of   the  world.      Similar   to   the   progress  
same-­‐‑sex   rights   have   recently  made   in   the  Untied   States,   there  
are   several   foreign   nations   that   now   afford   marital   rights   to  
same-­‐‑sex   couples.      Twelve   years   ago   the   Netherlands   became  
the   first   country   to   legalize   same-­‐‑sex  marriages.210     On  April   1,  
2001   the  Dutch  government   approved   legislation   affording   full  
marriage   rights   to   same-­‐‑sex   couples.211      Since   the  Netherland’s  
ground-­‐‑breaking   legislation,   sixteen   countries   now   recognize  
same-­‐‑sex   marriages   (Netherlands,   Belgium,   Spain,   Canada,  
 
   210.     Christy  Glass  et  al.,  Toward  a  ‘European  Model’  of  Same-­‐‑Sex  Marriage  Rights:  
A  Viable  Pathway  for  the  U.S.?,  29  BERKLEY  J.  INT’L  L.  132,  142  (2011).  
   211.     Id.  
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South   Africa,   Norway,   Sweden,   Portugal,   Iceland,   Argentina,  
Denmark,  France,  Brazil,  New  Zealand,  Uruguay,  and  Britain).212    
Additionally,   there   are   seven   foreign   nations   that   have   broad  
recognition   laws   for   non-­‐‑marital   same   sex   couples   (Ecuador,  
Finland,   Germany,   Greenland,   Hungary,   Ireland,   and  
Scotland).213      Moreover,   there   are   nine   countries   that   have  
limited   recognition   laws   for   non-­‐‑marital   same   sex   couples  
(Andorra,   Austria,   Colombia,   Croatia,   Czech   Republic,  
Liechtenstein,   Luxembourg,   Slovenia,   and   Switzerland).214    
Finally,   although   same-­‐‑sex   marriages   cannot   be   performed   in  
their   jurisdictions,   Israel   and   Mexico   recognize   same-­‐‑sex  
marriages  that  have  been  officiated  in  other  jurisdictions.215  
1.   The  United  Kingdom  
The  United  States’  method  of  taxing  spouses  is  quite  unique  
in  that  not  only  are  there  two  separate  taxing  entities  (the  federal  
and   state   taxing   departments),   but   also   in   that   the   federal  
government  allocates  to  the  states  the  authority  to  regulate  laws  
with   respect   to   domestic   relations.      This   combination   is   unlike  
most   other   nations,   and   therefore   a   seamless   comparative  
analysis   with   a   foreign   jurisdiction   is   quite   challenging.    
However,   the   United   States   and   United   Kingdom   share   many  
similarities  in  the  way  in  which  they  afford  recognition  to  same-­‐‑
 
   212.     Freedom   to  Marry,   Inc.,  The  Freedom   to  Marry   Internationally,   FREEDOM  TO  
MARRY,  
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/landscape/entry/c/international   (last   visited   Jul.  
28,  2013).  As  of  January  2014,  Britain  had  passed  a  law  that  has  not  yet  taken  effect.    
Id.  
   213.     Id.   It   is   important   to   note   that   currently   the  United  Kingdom  has   passed  
preliminary  legislation  that  would  allow  same-­‐‑sex  marriages.    Although  the  law  has  
not  been  finalized,  there  is  a  strong  likelihood  that  same-­‐‑sex  marriage  will  become  
legal   in   the   very   immediate   future.     See   Laura   Smith-­‐‑Spark  &  Atika   Shubert,  UK  
Lawmakers  Approve  Same-­‐‑sex  marriage  in  First  Vote,  CNN  (Feb.  5,  2013),  
http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/05/world/europe/uk-­‐‑gay-­‐‑marriage-­‐‑vote/index.html.    
   214.     Freedom   to  Marry,   Inc.,  The  Freedom   to  Marry   Internationally,   FREEDOM  TO  
MARRY,  
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/landscape/entry/c/international   (last   visited   Jul.  
28,  2013).  
   215.     Id.    
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sex   couples,   thereby   making   them   operative   comparative  
nations.      The   most   striking   similarity,   and   the   most   useful   in  
terms   of   this   Article’s   comparison,   is   the   similar   method   of  
incremental  reform  present  in  both  jurisdictions.    Like  the  rights  
afforded   to   same-­‐‑sex   relationships   in   the   United   States,   what  
was   once   nonexistent   in   the   United   Kingdom   has   gradually  
gained  recognition  in  several  jurisdictions.216    Moreover,  in  both  
jurisdictions,   the   laws   regarding   same-­‐‑sex   relationships   have  
evolved   slowly,   with   the   judiciary   playing   a   major   role   in   its  
development.217      Although   there   are   several   technicalities   that  
make   actual   implementation   of   the   United   Kingdom’s   tax  
regime  unlikely,   a   look   into   how   the   foreign   nation   recognizes  
non-­‐‑marital   relationships   provides   insight   as   to   how   a   nation  
can   recognize   these   less-­‐‑traditional   unions   while   staying  
consistent  with  legislative  intent.  
Currently,   the   rights   afforded   to   same-­‐‑sex   couples   in   the  
United  Kingdom  are  prescribed   in   the  United  Kingdom’s  Civil  
Partnership  Act  of   2004.218     Enacted  on  November  18,   2004,   the  
Act   provides   same-­‐‑sex   couples   in   England,219   Wales,220  
Scotland221   and   Northern   Ireland222   “legal   recognition   and  
 
   216.     See  Glass,  supra  note  209,  at  133  n.5,  141.  
   217.     Like   the  United   States,   uniform   change   throughout   the  United  Kingdom  
came  via  judicial  decision.    In  1981,  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (ECHR)  
decided  Dudgeon  v.  United  Kingdom  .  .  .  [T]he  ECHR  importantly  noted  that  the  state  
of  the  law  on  legal  regulation  of  sexual  conduct  between  members  of  the  same  sex  
was  not  uniform  throughout  the  United  Kingdom  .  .  .  The  Dudgeon  ruling  brought  
uniformity   to   the   laws   of   the   United   Kingdom,   but   this   uniformity   was   still  
discriminatory.      Andrew   Flagg,   Civil   Partnership   in   the   United   Kingdom   and   a  
Moderate  Proposal  for  Change  in  the  United  States,  22  ARIZ.  J.  INT’L  &  COMP.  L.  613,  617-­‐‑
19  (2006).      
   218.     Civil   Partnership   Act,   2004,   c.   33   (U.K.).   On   July   17,   2013,   during   the  
writing  of   this  Note,   the  Queen  of  England  granted  royal  assent   to  a  bill   that  will  
allow  same-­‐‑sex  marriages  in  England  and  Whales.    House  of  Lords,  UK  PARLIAMENT,  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldhansrd/text/130717-­‐‑
0001.htm#13071765000369  (last  visited  Mar.  17,  2014).  The  Bill,  which  has  no  effect  
on  the  other  territories  in  the  United  Kingdom,  demands  that  the  Secretary  of  State  
review  the  operation  and  future  of   the  Civil  Partnership  Act  2004   in  England  and  
Whales.    Marriage  (Same  Sex  Couples)  Act,  2013,  c.  30  §2.15  (U.K.).  
   219.     Civil  Partnership  Act,  2004,  c.  33,  Pt.  2  (U.K.).  
   220.     Id.  
   221.     Civil  Partnership  Act,  2004,  c.  33,  Pt.  3  (U.K.).  
   222.     Civil  Partnership  Act,  2004,  c.  33,  Pt.  4  (U.K.).  
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substantial  [civil]  rights.”223    Under  the  Act,  a  civil  partnership  is  
defined  as   “a   relationship  between   two  people  of   the   same   sex  
(‘civil   partners’)   which   is   formed   when   they   register   as   civil  
partners   of   each   other”   in   any   of   the   United   Kingdom’s   four  
countries.224      Although   the   legal   recognition   afforded   to   civil  
partners   is   not   identical   to   that   of   a   “civil  marriage”,   the  Civil  
Partnership   Act   provides   broad   recognition   laws   to   same-­‐‑sex  
couples.225  
Most   noteworthy,   as   a   result   of   the   Civil   Partnership  Act,  
civil   partners   can   receive   the   same   tax   and   property   benefits  
given  to  married  couples.     For  instance,  in  the  United  Kingdom  
civil   partners   can   claim   the  Married  Couple’s  Allowance.226      In  
civil  marriages,  the  husband’s  income  is  used  in  determining  the  
Married  Couple’s  Allowance.    In  civil  partnerships,  however,  the  
income   of   the   highest   earner   is   used.227      Given   the   stringent  
requirements   of   the   Married   Couples’   Allowance,228   this   tax  
break   is   only   beneficial   to   a   very   small  minority   of   the  United  
Kingdom.      However,   what   is   relevant   to   this   comparative  
analysis   is   that   the   United   Kingdom   is   extending   a   marital  
benefit   to   civil   partnerships,  while   still   allowing   the   individual  
jurisdictions   to   decide   the   level   and   method   of   recognition  
afforded  to  same-­‐‑sex  couples.  
Additionally,  civil  partners  in  the  United  Kingdom  have  the  
potential   to   save   substantial   amounts   of  money   via   exemption  
from   the   inheritance   tax.      Due   to   the   Civil   Partnership   Act,  
registered   same-­‐‑sex   couples   can   now   give   and   receive   gifts  
 
   223.     Flagg,  supra  note  216,  at  614.  See  Civil  Partnership  Act,  2004,  c.  33,  §§  65-­‐‑72,  
75-­‐‑79,  83,  84  (U.K.).  
   224.     Civil  Partnership  Act,  2004,  c.  33,  (U.K.).  
   225.     Flagg,  supra  note  216,  at  614.    
   226.     Determined  on  a  pro-­‐‑rata  basis,  the  Married  couples  allowance  reduces  the  
married   couple’s   tax   bill   up   to   £816.50.      See  Married   Couple’s   Allowance,  GOV.UK  
(Nov.  8,  2013),  https://www.gov.uk/married-­‐‑couples-­‐‑allowance/overview.    
   227.     Id.  
   228.     The  Married  Couple’s  Allowance   is   only   available   to  married   couples   or  
civil   partners   if   at   least   one   spouse   was   born   before   April   6,   1935.      See  Married  
Couple’s   Allowance-­‐‑   Includes   Civil   Partnerships,   HM   REVENUE   &   CUSTOMS,  
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/incometax/married-­‐‑allow.htm  (last  visited  Mar.  17,  2014).  
MARTINS  MACRO.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   6/13/14    9:59  AM  
280   MARQUETTE  ELDER’S  ADVISOR   [Vol.  15  
without   “attracting”   the   inheritance   tax.229      Under   the   civil  
partner   exception,   married   couples   and   civil   partners   can  
transfer  assets  to  one  another  during  their  lifetime,  or  when  they  
die,  without  being  subject  to  the  Inheritance  Tax.230    This  benefit  
is  afforded  to  the  civil  partners  because  they  are  covered  by  the  
same   spousal   exemption   rules   that   are   applied   to   married  
couples.231      Moreover,   civil   partners   receive   benefits   regarding  
inheritance   tax  via   their   ability   to   transfer   a  deceased  partner’s  
inheritance   tax   threshold   to   themselves.232      To   avoid   being  
subject   to   the   inheritance   tax,   the   entire   estate   must   meet   the  
current  threshold  of  £325,000.233    For  any  amount  above  £325,000,  
tax   will   be   due   at   a   rate   of   40   percent.234      However,   married  
couples   and   registered   civil   partners   can   transfer   their   unused  
inheritance   tax   threshold,  making   for   a  maximum   threshold   of  
£650,000.235      This   inheritance   exemption   is   not   unlike   the  
exemption   found   in   Section   2010(c)   of   the   IRC.236      There   is,   of  
course   one   substantial   difference:   the   United   Kingdom   allows  
same-­‐‑sex   non-­‐‑marital   relationships   to   qualify   for   the   benefits  
afforded  by  the  exemption.  
Civil   partners   can   also   take   advantage   of   the   reduction   in  
capital   gains   tax,   as   afforded   to   married   couples.      Currently,  
each  partner  has  an  annual  allowance  of  £10,900  (as  is  the  same  
 
   229.   Civil  Partnerships,  GUARDIAN  (Dec.  5,  2005),  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2005/dec/05/planningyourwedding.gayrights.  
   230.     See   Transferring   an   Unused   Inheritance   Tax   Threshold,   HM   REVENUE   &  
CUSTOMS,  
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/inheritancetax/intro/transfer-­‐‑threshold.htm   (last   visited  
Mar.  17,  2014).  
   231.     Id.  
   232.     Id.  The  inheritance  tax  threshold  is  also  known  as  the  “nil  rate  band.”  Id.        
   233.     £650,000   if   deceased   partner’s   entire   nil   rate   band  was   transferred   to   the  
surviving  civil  partner.    Id.  
   234.     Inheritance,  GOV.UK  (Dec.  27,  2013),  https://www.gov.uk/inheritance-­‐‑tax#.    
   235.     The  United  Kingdom’s  revenue  offers   its   taxpayers  examples  on  how  this  
unusual   concept   of   transferring   thresholds   work.      See   Transferring   an   Unused  
Inheritance   Tax   Threshold,   HM   REVENUE   &   CUSTOMS,  
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/inheritancetax/intro/transfer-­‐‑threshold.htm   (last   visited  
Apr.  19,  2014).  
   236.     See  I.R.C,  §  2010(c)  (2014),  supra  note  70  and  accompanying  text.  
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with  non-­‐‑married  or  non-­‐‑registered   individuals).237     The  benefit  
afforded   to   same-­‐‑sex   couples   comes   with   the   ability   to   freely  
transfer   the   assets   between   one   another   before   the   assets   are  
sold,   allowing   for   optimal   use   of   the   capital   gains   tax  
allowance.238      Moreover,   given   the   structure   of   the   United  
Kingdom’s   tax   code   regarding  married   couples   and   registered  
civil   partnerships,   it   is   possible   for   these   recognized   unions   to  
decrease   their   overall   tax   bill   by   distributing   their   wealth  
between   the   two  parties,   in   order   to  maximize   use   of   personal  
allowances.239    This  optimal  use  of  personal  allowances  results  in  
the  taxpayers  being  taxed  at  the  lowest  possible  marginal  rate.240  
The   United   Kingdom’s   method   of   taxing   civil   unions  
exemplifies   the   logic   in   treating   non-­‐‑marital   relationships   the  
same  as  legally  married  couples  for  taxation  purposes.    Without  
making   same-­‐‑sex  marriages   legal   in   all   of   its   jurisdictions,   the  
United   Kingdom   is   able   to   ensure   that   individuals   in   non-­‐‑
marital   relationships   receive   the   same   benefits   as   married  
couples.      It  appears   that   the  United  Kingdom  was  cognizant  of  
the  fact   that  despite  the   inability  of  same-­‐‑sex  couples  to  receive  
marital   recognition,   individuals   in   such   relationships  
undeniably   act,   live   and   engage   in   economic   transactions   in   a  
manner  identical  to  that  of  legally  recognized  married  couples.  
V.  THE  FEDERAL  INCOME  TAX  AS  APPLIED  TO  NON-­‐‑MARITAL  
RELATIONSHIPS  
Although   the   overturning   of   DOMA   is   a   profound   victory   for  
the   equal   rights   movement,   it   leads   to   another   area   of  
uncertainty   regarding   federal   taxation.      Now   that   there   is   no  
longer  a  roadblock  preventing  federal  agencies  from  recognizing  
 
   237.     See  Introduction  to  Capital  Gains  Tax,  HM  REVENUE  &  CUSTOMS,  
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/cgt/intro/basics.htm  (last  visited  Apr.  19,  2014).    
   238.     Id.    
   239.     John  Greenwood,  The  Tax  Advantages  of  Getting  Married,  TELEGRAPH,   June  
11,  2012,  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/consumertips/  
tax/9324479/The-­‐‑tax-­‐‑advantages-­‐‑of-­‐‑getting-­‐‑married.html.  
   240.     Id.  
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same-­‐‑sex   married   couples,   the   IRS   will   afford   spousal  
recognition  to  such  unions,  as  the  IRC  explicitly  indicates  that  it  
recognizes   “married   individuals.”      However,   this   spousal  
recognition   will   not   be   extended   to   non-­‐‑marital   relationships,  
even   in   states   where   these   unions   are   marriage   equivalents.    
Unfortunately,   this   lack   of   federal   recognition   is   generated   by  
the  mere  terminology  used  to  define  the  unions.    The  difference  
in   legal   recognition   between   marriages   and   non-­‐‑marital  
relationships  presents  the  problem  analyzed  in  this  Article:  How  
should   the   IRS   treat   legally   recognized   non-­‐‑marital  
relationships?  
Not   surprisingly,   the   IRS   itself   seems   to   be   perplexed   by  
this   question.     Currently,   a   limited  number   of   states   offer   non-­‐‑
marital   relationship   recognition   to   opposite-­‐‑sex   couples.241    
Signed   into   law   on   January   31,   2011,   the   Illinois   Religious  
Freedom  Protection  and  Civil  Union  Act242  allows  all  couples  to  
enter  into  a  civil  union.243    Understandably  confused,  an  advisor  
from  H&R  Block  wrote  to  the  IRS  requesting  information  on  the  
federal  filing  status  of  parties   in  opposite-­‐‑sex  civil  unions.244      In  
response,   the   Chief   Counsel’s   Office   sent   a   letter   stating,   “[I]f  
Illinois   treats   the   parties   to   an   Illinois   civil   union   who   are   of  
opposite  sex  as  husband  and  wife  [which  Illinois  law,  practically  
speaking,   does],   they   are   considered   ‘husband   and   wife’   for  
purposes   of   Section   6013   of   the   Internal   Revenue   Code.”245    
However,  a  few  weeks  later,  the  IRS  posted  a  series  of  questions  
and   answers   regarding   registered   domestic   partnerships.246      In  
addition  to  discussing  the  specific  reporting  rules  applicable,  the  
IRS  addressed  registered  domestic  partnerships  generally  saying  
that  parties  to  such  “cannot  file  using  a  married  filing  separately  
 
   241.     Most   notably,   California   and   Illinois.      See  CAL.   FAM.   CODE   §§   297-­‐‑297.5  
(2003);   Illinois  Religious   Freedom  Protection   and  Civil  Union  Act,   750   ILL.  COMP.  
STAT.  75/5  (2011).    
   242.     See   Illinois   Religious   Freedom   Protection   and   Civil   Union   Act,   750   ILL.  
COMP.  STAT.  75/10  (2011).  
   243.     Id.    
   244.     Smith,  supra  note  21,  at  43  n.51.    
   245.     Id.    
   246.     Id.  at  45-­‐‑46.    
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or   jointly   filing   status,  because   they  are  not   spouses  as  defined  
by  federal  law.”247    Thereafter,  the  IRS  amended  its  position  even  
further,   altering   its   posting   on   registered   domestic   partners   to  
read,   “Registered   domestic   partners.  .  .are   not   married   for  
federal   tax  purposes.”248     Although   the  Chief  Counsel’s   letter   is  
not   binding   authority,249   its   contents   exemplify   the   notion   that  
even  the  federal  agency  in  control  of  taxation  is  unaware  of  how  
to  treat  non-­‐‑marital  relationships.  
VI.  GOODBYE,  DOMA.    HELLO  .  .  .  MORE  CONFUSION?  
While  the  Court’s  decision  in  Windsor  was  an  undeniable  victory  
for  the  gay  rights  movement,   it   is   imperative  to  note  that   it  did  
not   concern   the   constitutional   right   of   same-­‐‑sex   persons   to  
marry.     Consequently,   the  Court   did   not   implement   a   national  
legalization   of   same-­‐‑sex   marriages,   and   therefore   the   states  
continue   to  have   the  ability   to  determine  whether  or  not   it  will  
solemnize   such   unions.      While   the   newly   afforded   federal  
recognition   may   motivate   states   to   convert   their   non-­‐‑marital  
relationships   into   marriages,   this   conversion   certainly   is   not  
mandatory.     Moreover,   there  are   some  states   that  will   continue  
to   refuse   recognizing  any   form  of   same-­‐‑sex   relationship;   this   is  
particularly   likely   in   the   states   that   have   made   constitutional  
amendments   banning   the   recognition   of   same-­‐‑sex  marriages.250    
The   undeniable   presence   of   state   recognized   non-­‐‑marital  
relationship,  coupled  with  their  lack  of  federal  recognition,  leads  
to  another  area  of  confusion-­‐‑the  taxation  of  marital  equivalents.    
 
   247.     Id.      
   248.     Internal   Revenue   Service,      Answers   to   Frequently   Asked   Questions   for  
Registered   Domestic   Partners   and   Individuals   in   Civil   Unions,   INTERNAL   REVENUE  
SERVICE   (Sep.   19,   2013),   http://www.irs.gov/uac/Answers-­‐‑to-­‐‑Frequently-­‐‑Asked-­‐‑
Questions-­‐‑for-­‐‑Registered-­‐‑Domestic-­‐‑Partners-­‐‑and-­‐‑Individuals-­‐‑in-­‐‑Civil-­‐‑Unions.  
   249.     Smith,  supra  note  21,  at  43-­‐‑44  n.51.  
   250.     For   instance,   Virginia   has   a   constitutional   amendment   saying   it   will   not  
“recognize  a  legal  status  for  relationships  of  unmarried  individuals  that  intends  to  
approximate   the   design,   qualities,   significance,   or   effects   of  marriage”   nor  will   it  
“recognize  another  union,  partnership,  or  other  legal  status  to  which  is  assigned  the  
rights,  benefits,  obligations,  qualities,  or  effects  of  marriage.”    See  VA.  CONST.  art.  I,  
§  15-­‐‑A.  
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The  question  now  becomes:  How  should  the  IRS  now  treat  these  
couples?  
A.     CONSISTENCY,  CONSISTENCY,  CONSISTENCY  
Following  the  lead  of  the  Internal  Revenue  Service,  all  states  
that   have   income   tax   systems   allow   opposite-­‐‑sex   married  
couples  to  jointly  file  their  income  taxes.251    In  keeping  consistent  
with  the  IRS’  filing  regulations,  all  states  that  impose  an  income  
tax   also   allow   opposite-­‐‑sex   married   individuals   to   file   with   a  
status   of   single,   head   of   household,   or   even   married   filing  
jointly.252    However,  as  discussed  in  Part  III  of  this  Article,  there  
is   a   great   deal   of   inconsistency   among   the   states   regarding   the  
rights  afforded  to  same-­‐‑sex  couples.    Although  DOMA  has  been  
ruled   unconstitutional,   states   are   still   not   forced   to   recognize  
same-­‐‑sex   marriages.      The   deferral   to   each   state’s   local   law  
determination   of   marital   status   eliminates   the   possibility   of  
complete   uniformity   of   same-­‐‑sex   recognition   law   across   the  
nation.      Given   the   obvious   presence   of   inconsistencies,   it   is  
imperative  that  the  IRS  take  the  steps  necessary  to  ensure  that  it  
is  not  contributing  to  the  already  all-­‐‑too-­‐‑present  confusion.    The  
most  efficient   solution,  considering  Congress’   long-­‐‑held  goal  of  
geographic   uniformity   and   its   deference   to   state   regulation   of  
marriage,  is  for  the  IRS  to  recognize  non-­‐‑marital  relationships  in  
the  states  that  treat  such  unions  as  marriage  equivalents.  
1.   Congressional  Aims  
Congress’   enactment   of   the   Revenue   Act   of   1948   clearly  
showed   its   purported   intent   of   ensuring   the   constitutional  
requirement   of   geographic   uniformity.253      Since   the  
congressional   enactment,   substantial   case   law   and   legislation  
has   shown   both   the   judicial   and   legislative   intent   of   the  
government   to   ensure   geographic   uniformity   and   horizontal  
 
   251.     Smith,  supra  note  21,  at  40.  
   252.     Id.  
   253.     See  Milstein,  supra  note  17,  at  460.  
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equity.254    In  order  for  these  ideals  to  be  respected,  the  IRS  must  
recognize   not   only   married   couples,   but   also   non-­‐‑marital  
relationships  that  serve  as  marriage  equivalents.  
Congress’   adherence   to   the   principle   of   geographic  
uniformity   is   undeniable   in   the   area   of   federal   taxation.      Not  
only   was   geographic   uniformity   stated   as   the   purpose   of   the  
joint-­‐‑filing  system  created  by  the  Revenue  Act  of  1948,255  but  the  
Supreme   Court   has   also   echoed   the   sentiment   that   geographic  
uniformity  is  a  constitutional  requirement.256    Both  the  legislative  
and   judicial   proclamations   regarding   the   importance   of  
geographic  uniformity  came  as  a  result  of  the  patchwork  nature  
of  community  property  states.    Furthermore,  the  remedial  intent  
of  the  Revenue  Act  of  1948  was  able  to  eliminate  this  geographic  
disparity.      Unfortunately,   however,   due   to   the   existing  
patchwork   nature   of   states’   recognition   of   same-­‐‑sex  
relationships,   the   exact   problem   Congress   eliminated   is   now  
infiltrating  the  taxation  of  non-­‐‑marital  relationships.  
Similar   to   the   geographic   inconsistency   of   community  
property  states  prior  to  1948,  there  is  a  patchwork  of  recognition  
of  non-­‐‑marital  relationships  among  the  states.    Moreover,  among  
the  states  that  afford  spousal  rights  to  non-­‐‑marital  relationships,  
there   is   a   patchwork   nature   of   community   property   and   non-­‐‑
community   property   laws.      Take,   for   example,   California   and  
Illinois,   both   of   which   treat   to   non-­‐‑marital   relationships   as  
marriage   equivalents.      California,   however,   is   a   community  
property  state,257  whereas  Illinois  is  not.258    In  2010,  the  IRS  ruled  
that  because  California  is  a  community  property  state,  California  
registered   domestic   partnerships   are   entitled   to   the   income  
 
   254.     See,   e.g.,   Druker   v.   Comm’r,   697   F.2d   46   (2d   Cir.   1982);   Broder   v.  
Cablevision  Sys.  Corp.,  418  F.3d  187  (2d  Cir.  2005);  In  re  Sullivan  680  F.2d  1131  (7th  
Cir.  1982).    
   255.     Wesley  A.  Dierberger,  Revenue  Act   of   1948,   25   IND.  L.J.   415,   415-­‐‑16   (1950),  
available  at  http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol25/iss3/15/.  
   256.     Poe  v.  Seaborn,  282  U.S.  101,  117  (1930).  
   257.     Smith,  supra  note  21,  at  45.  
   258.     Dennis  J.  Ventry,  Jr.,  Saving  Seaborn:  Ownership  Not  Marriage  as  the  Basis  of  
Family  Taxation,  86  IND.  L.J.  1459,  1522  (2011)  (Noting  that  Illinois  is  not  on  the  list  of  
community  property  states).  
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splitting  approach,  as  prescribed  in  Poe  v.  Seaborn.259     Therefore,  
parties  in  a  same-­‐‑sex  domestic  partnership  in  California  can  split  
their   income,  while   parties   to   a   same-­‐‑sex   civil   union   in   Illinois  
may   not.      The   dispositive   factor   in   these   scenarios   is   not   the  
sexuality  of  the  involved  parties,  but  rather  the  property  laws  of  
the  respective  states.    Say,  for  example,  Chris  and  Steve  are  in  a  
recognized   non-­‐‑marital   relationship   and   that   Chris   earned  
$100,000   and   Steve   earned   $0.      In   California,   a   community  
property   state,   each   could   file   a   single   federal   tax   return  
reporting   $50,000  of   income,   resulting   in   a   lower   aggregate   tax  
paid  due  to  the  progressive  nature  of  the  tax  system.    In  the  non-­‐‑
community   property   state   of   Illinois,   however,   Chris   would  
have  to  file  as  single  and  report   the  full  $100,000,  resulting   in  a  
higher  total  tax  paid.    Undeniably,  the  current  inconsistencies  in  
the   tax   treatment   of   non-­‐‑marital   relationships   are   identical   to  
those   that   the   Court   faced   in  Poe   v.   Seaborn260  —preferential   to  
community  property  states.  
Just  as  Congress  acted   in  1948   to  equalize   the   treatment  of  
community   property   and   non-­‐‑community   property   states   by  
creating  a   tax  structure  that  effectively  created  the  Poe  outcome  
for  everyone  in  opposite-­‐‑sex  marriages,  Congress  should  amend  
the   IRC   to   ensure   that   non-­‐‑marital   relationships   in   broad  
recognition  states  are  subject   to   the  same  tax  rate  and  other   tax  
rules   as   those   for   spouses.     Of   course,   it   is   the   states   that  may  
choose,   either   through   the   legislative   or   constitutional   process,  
to  redefine  marriage.261    So  too,  it  is  the  states  that  can  afford  the  
same   benefits,   burdens,   and   protections   to   non-­‐‑marital  
relationships.    If  a  state  decides  not  to  modify  their  familial  law  
to   recognize   same-­‐‑sex   couples,   the  power   is  with   the  people  of  
the   state   to   take   action   via   their   ballots.      The   IRS   cannot   force  
states  to  give  marital  benefits  to  non-­‐‑marital  relationships,  but  it  
can—and   in   order   to   keep   uniformity,   it   must—recognize   the  
 
   259.     Poe,  282  U.S.  at  118.  
   260.     Poe,  282  U.S.  at  113-­‐‑14.    
   261.     See   Golinski   v.   Office   of   Pers.  Mgmt.,   824   F.Supp.2d   968,   988   (N.D.   Cal.  
2012).  
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legislative  intent  of  the  states.  
Moreover,   amending   the   IRC   to   recognize   non-­‐‑marital  
relationships  in  broad  recognition  states  is  necessary  to  preserve  
the  second  congressional  aim  of  horizontal  equity.     The  general  
concept   of   horizontal   equity   ensures   that   similarly   situated  
taxpayers   receive   the   same   tax   treatment.      Undoubtedly,   the  
Revenue   Act   of   1948   ensured   horizontal   equity   among   all   the  
states,  as  the  ability  to  split  income  was  no  longer  determined  by  
the   residency   of   the   taxpayers.      However,   the   principles   of  
horizontal   equity   are   not   designed   exclusively   for   marital  
purposes.     Rather,   the  concept   focuses  on  the  similarities  of   the  
parties  involved.262    Of  course,  horizontal  equity  regarding  same-­‐‑
sex   marriages   will   not   be   completely   eliminated   until   such  
unions  become  legal  in  every  state.    However,  now  that  DOMA  
has  been  overturned,  in  order  to  preserve  horizontal  equity,  it  is  
imperative  that  the  IRS  recognize  non-­‐‑marital  relationships  if  the  
respective  state  considers  them  marriage  equivalents.  
Say,   for   instance,   there   is   a   same-­‐‑sex   married   couple   in  
Connecticut   and   a   same-­‐‑sex   couple   in   a   civil   union   in   Illinois.    
The   Illinois   statute   mandates   that   the   same-­‐‑sex   couple   receive  
“the   same   legal   obligations,   responsibilities,   protections   and  
benefits”  that  married  couples  receive.263    Assuming  the  couples  
have   identical   incomes,   they   are   similarly   situated.      Although  
the  couples  in  both  states  receive  marital  recognition  for  state  tax  
purposes,   the   Connecticut   couple   will   receive   spousal  
recognition  by  the  IRS,  whereas  the  Illinois  couple  will  not.    The  
only   feature   distinguishing   these   two   relationships   is   their  
different   titles.      As   the   Supreme   Court   held   in   Hisquierdo   v.  
Hisquierdo,   a   mere   conflict   of   words   in   family   law   is   not  
sufficient.264  
 
   262.     Poe,  282  U.S.  at  117-­‐‑18.  
   263.     750  ILL.  COMP.  STAT.  75/20  (2009).  
   264.     Hisquierdo  v.  Hisquierdo,  439  U.S.  572,  581  (1976).  
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2.   Deferral  to  State  Family  Law  
Affording   federal   recognition   to   non-­‐‑marital   relationships  
in   broad   recognition   states   will   also   keep   consistent   with   the  
IRS’  long  held  precedent  of  deferring  to  state  marital  law.    Since  
1958,   the   IRS  has  allowed  state   law   to  define   the  marital   status  
that  will  be   referred   to   for   federal   taxation  purposes.265      In   that  
year,   the   Internal   Revenue   Board   issued   a   ruling   that   “the  
marital   status   of   individuals   as   determined   under   state   law   is  
recognized   in   the   administration   of   the   Federal   income   tax  
laws.”266      Several   years   later,   in   1980,   the   Tax   Court   held   that  
“the   determination   of   the  marital   status   of   the   parties  must   be  
made   in   accordance   with   [state   law].”267      More   recently,   in  
Hisquierdo,   the   Supreme   Court   emphasized   this   point   holding  
that,  
On   the   rare   occasion  when   state   family   law  has   come  
into   conflict   with   a   federal   statute,   this   Court   has  
limited   review   under   the   Supremacy   Clause   to   a  
determination   whether   Congress   has   ‘positively  
required   by   direct   enactment’   that   state   law   be   pre-­‐‑
empted.  .  .A   mere   conflict   in   words   is   not   sufficient.    
State   family   and   family-­‐‑property   law   must   do   ‘major  
damage’   to   ‘clear   and   substantial’   federal   interests  
before   the   Supremacy   Clause   will   demand   that   state  
law  be  overridden.268  
There   is   undeniably   a   long-­‐‑standing   precedent   established  
through   substantial   case   law   requiring   the   IRS   to  defer   to   state  
law  determinations  of  marriages.    The  Supreme  Court’s  holding  
in  Hisquierdo   is   broad   enough   to   ensure   that   such   deferral   be  
made   in   the   context   of   non-­‐‑marital   relationships.      The   Court  
does   not   use   limiting  words   such   as  marital   law,  marriage,   or  
even   spouse.      Rather,   the   Court   carefully   uses   the   word  
“family,”  a  term  which  by  no  means  can  exclude  those  involved  
 
   265.       Hayes,  supra  note  13,  at  1615.  
   266.     Rev.  Rul.  58-­‐‑66,  1958-­‐‑1  C.B.  60.    
   267.     Boyter  v.  Comm’r,  74  T.C.  989,  994  (1980)  (citing  Dunn  v.  Comm’r,  64  T.C.  
361  (1978)).      
   268.     Hisquierdo,  439  U.S.  at  581.  
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in   non-­‐‑marital   relationships.      Consequently,   the   federal  
government  must   yield   to   state   law  provisions   regulating  non-­‐‑
marital  relationships.  
However,   this   does   not   mean   that   the   IRS   should   afford  
recognition   to  all  non-­‐‑marital   relationships.     Not  only  must   the  
IRS  remain  consistent  with   its   long  held  precedent  of  deferring  
to  state  law,  it  also  must  remain  consistent  with  the  actual  state  
law.      Therefore,   this  Article   suggests   that   the   IRS   give   spousal  
recognition  to  the  parties  of  non-­‐‑marital  relationships  only  in  the  
states  that  consider  these  unions  to  be  marriage  equivalents.    In  
doing   so,   the   IRS   will   not   only   be   consistent   with   long   held  
precedent,  but   it  will  also  remain  consistent  with  the  legislative  
intent  of  the  federal  government  and  the  respective  states.  
VII.  CONCLUSION  
To   ensure   a   peaceful   co-­‐‑existence   with   an   ever-­‐‑progressing  
society,   Congress   has   continually   enacted,   amended,   and  
removed   laws   in   order   to   conform   to   the   needs   of   American  
citizens.      A   country   that   was   once   plagued   with   racial  
inequalities   now   prides   itself   on   diversity.      Similarly,   over   the  
past   century,   the   tax   laws   have   substantially   changed   not   just  
because   of   a   change   in   the   government’s   fiscal   needs,   but   also  
because  of  a  change  in  societal  needs.    Like  the  biracial  married  
couple   in  Loving  v.  Virginia,   taxpayers   in  same-­‐‑sex  relationships  
will  eventually  receive  equal  taxation,  for  they  too  are   just  that:  
tax  payers.    Of  course,  it  is  up  to  the  people  of  the  states  to  decide,  
via   their   electoral   right,   the  definition  of   a  marriage.     The   least  
the  federal  government  can  do  is  respect  the  wishes  of  the  states,  
for   they   are   presumably   respecting   the  wishes   of   their   people.    
In  a  post-­‐‑DOMA  world,  the  IRS  must  afford  legal  recognition  to  
non-­‐‑marital   relationships   in   broad   recognition   states.    
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